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1 Introduction
With independence referendums in Scotland and Catalonia, increasing electoral support
for regionalist parties in Belgium and Italy and surging separatist movements throughout
Ukraine, the threat of regional instability seems well on its way to reclaim a prominent
spot on the European political agenda. One novel feature is that regional independence
movements increasingly utilize the electoral arena to posit their claims for more regional
autonomy - or even secession - from the central government (Sorens, 2008).
In the slipstream of these events, economists have developed a small but growing
theoretical literature aimed at isolating the political and economic forces that determine
these processes of border formation. Agreeing on the fact that larger countries benefit
from scale economies in the provision of public goods, one approach contends that larger
political jurisdictions also suffer heterogeneity costs stemming from more diverse policy
preferences (Alesina & Spolaore, 1997, 2003, AS hence on) whereas a quite different strand
of the literature highlights differing fiscal preferences, originating from interregional income
distribution differentials, in shaping incentives to secede (Bolton & Roland, 1997, BR hence
on). As mentioned by Spolaore (2010), however, the theoretical study of the relationship
between preference heterogeneity, income differences and the stability of countries is still
in its infancy. Furthermore, quantitative applications of these frameworks remain scarce,
such that their empirical validity and consequences remain unclear.
This paper aims to make progress on both fronts. First, it aims to reconcile the
two dominant strands of the theoretical literature surrounding regional (in)stability by
proposing a broad theoretical model of state fragmentation that combines key insights
from both approaches. Secondly, as a way of validating the model, it is applied to a
set of 264 regions in 26 European countries to identify both the most secession-prone
European regions and the most secession-robust European countries. In doing so, it also
diverges from the existing literature - which tends to approximate regional preference
heterogeneity by the genetic, ethno-linguistic or cultural distances among populations -
and proposes a novel and more direct indicator of regional political distinctiveness, rooted
in the discrepancy between regional and national electoral behavior.
In our model, central governments provide a single public good representing a bundle
of policy choices. Public policy is financed through a proportional income tax schedule,
determined through majority voting. Agents, residing in a particular region of their coun-
try, vote on the optimal level of public spending taking into account increasing returns to
scale in the provision of public goods, the intensity of their preference for the public good,
the political distinctiveness of their policy preferences as well as their individual income
level. Both richer agents and agents with more distinct policy preferences have a prefer-
ence for lower tax rates, poorer agents and agents with policy preferences more closely
aligned to those of the majority of the electorate prefer higher taxes; the equilibrium tax
rate is the one most preferred by the median tax voter. These assumptions generate a
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trade-off: separation would allow agents within a region to exercise greater influence on
the content and the size of government whereas preserving the union would allow them
to exploit economies of scale in the provision of government. Under the assumption that
the decision to separate is taken by majority voting at the regional level, we explore the
influence of various features of regions in shaping this trade-off.
First, we demonstrate that, except for the richest agents, the net welfare gain of sep-
aration increases in the relative size of the future state. The intuition behind this result
is that smaller regions experience a more pronounced economy of scale disadvantage of
secession, such that the economic costs of separation weigh more heavily on them. This
finding resonates with the programmatic shift of the amalgam of North Italian regional-
ist movements to merge into a common Lega Nord party, which subsequently gathered
significant electoral support based on a political program advocating the independence of
Greater Padania from the rest of the country (Giordano, 2000, 2001).
Second, we show that the incentive to secede is unambiguously increasing in the dis-
tinctiveness of own regional policy preferences. In other words, the larger the distance
between regionally preferred and actually provided public policy, the larger the political
gain of separation. Consistent with this explanation, the Scottish independence referen-
dum was defended by the Scottish Government (2013, p. xi) on the grounds that this
would ensure that “it will no longer be possible for governments to be elected and pursue
policies against the wishes of the Scottish people”.
Third, we illustrate that whenever the income differential between the regional and the
national median tax voter is positive, there is an additional tax base benefit of separation.
Indeed, a positive differential signifies that richer regions no longer need to provide tax
transfers to poorer regions in case of separation. As noted by BR, social security transfers
are an important reason why Flanders may want to secede from the Walloon region in
Belgium. More recently, the anti-redistribution argument was raised by both Catalan and
Scottish nationalists to justify their claim for the outright independence of their region.
Fourth, we find that regional instability is increasing in the similarity between indi-
vidual and regional fiscal preferences. In the context of our model, this implies that the
net welfare gain of separation increases whenever individual fiscal preferences correspond
more strongly with those of the regional median tax voter. The portrayal of the Belgian
experience as an example of tax-cutting separatism, where autonomy is “no longer pre-
sented as a goal in itself, but instead as a means of implementing a right-wing economic
policy that Flemish people actually voted for” (The Economist, 2014, p. 64), is consistent
with this implication. Moreover, the outcome of the recent devolution debate in Scotland
illustrates that regions do care about autonomy over fiscal policy (BBC, 2014).
Finally, we highlight that for the richest agents, the incentives to secede are decreasing
in the degree of preference heterogeneity in the rest of the country. Note that the existing
literature is silent on potential stabilizing effects of preference heterogeneity at the country
level. The reason for this slightly counter-intuitive result is that, by reducing the utility
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derived from public policy, preference heterogeneity in the rest of the country may serve
as an instrument bringing tax rates closer in line with the fiscal preferences of the wealthy.
This includes the possibility that the upper income class in the United Kingdom (UK)
benefited from the notorious Scottish opposition to nuclear weapons, which stands in stark
contrast to its UK-wide support, to the extent that this Scottish skepticism discouraged
further tax-spending investments in the British nuclear weapons arsenal.1
The next step is to move beyond anecdotal empirical evidence and to assess the validity
and the empirical implications of this theoretical model with respect to the current map
of Europe. Applying the calibrated model to a set of over 260 regions in 26 European
countries we find that, in a context of increasing nationalism, Catalonia, Flanders and the
Basque country are the regions that are currently the most likely to break away. Consistent
with these results, local governments in all three regions have systematically called for
increased regional autonomy and two of them recently took steps to organize independence
referendums. Further down the list, we quickly run into other ‘usual suspects’, such as
Scotland (4th), Italian South-Tyrol (7th) and the French isle of Corsica (9th), but we also
encounter lesser-known separatist hotspots, including Bulgaria’s Turkish minorities in the
provinces of Kardzhali (5th) and Razgrad (10th) and the Hungarian minority in Romania’s
Transylvanic region (11th). Focusing on the most secession-robust countries, we find that
Denmark, Hungary and Slovenia top the list, closely followed by Norway and the Czech
Republic. Reassuringly, these countries effectively seem to lack the presence of credible
autonomist movements. These results are taken as tentative proof of the model’s capacity
to partially explain present-day heterogeneity in regional instability in a European context,
meriting further research on its general applicability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a concise
overview of the existing theoretical literature on regional instability. In section 3 we
present the basic model while the proposed indicator of regional political distinctiveness
is discussed in section 4. Section 5 explains the empirical strategy and contains the data
description. Section 6 calibrates the model and identifies the most secession-prone regions
as well as the most secession-robust countries in Europe. Section 7 concludes.
1In 2007, for instance, a majority of Scottish members of Parliament rebelled in a crucial vote to renew
the nuclear weapons system, forcing prime minister Tony Blair to rely on the support of the Tories to
secure Trident’s replacement (BBC, 2007).
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2 Theoretical literature2
Economic thinking on the determinants of state size can at least be traced back to the con-
ference on the “Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations” held by the International
Economic Association in 1957, the proceedings of which were published in a compendium
in 1960 (Robinson, 1960). Interestingly, the contribution by Kuznets (1960, p. 28) already
hints at the existence of a trade-off between the costs and the benefits of state size when
he argues that “in principle, small countries have a handicap for economic growth”, due to
a greater dependence on international trade and diseconomies of scale in national defense
policy, but that the prospect of a smaller, more homogeneous population may enable them
to more easily “make the social adjustments needed to take advantage of the potentialities
of modern technology and economic growth”. Other early work includes Friedman (1977),
where rulers shape countries to maximize net tax revenues; Cremer, Kerchove, and Thisse
(1985), who develop a spatial competition model to analyze how the geographical spread of
public facilities is affected by a trade-off between travel and tax costs; and Buchanan and
Faith (1987), who demonstrate that the existence of a secession-option implicitly imposes
an upper limit on the tax burden a ruling elite can impose on a minority.
In their seminal contribution, AS develop a Hotelling (1929)-type model where coun-
try size is determined by a trade-off between economies of scale in the provision of public
goods, allowing larger states to offer more value for tax money, and heterogeneity costs,
making it more difficult for a government to satisfy the policy preferences of its electorate.
This trade-off is moderated by a number of channels, such that size benefits are greater
the higher the impediments to trade and the larger the threat of international conflict.
Political institutions matter as well, since autocratic regimes are less exposed to hetero-
geneity costs. In this setting, they emphasize that majority voting over national borders
results in a tendency towards an equilibrium with too many small nations. However, they
limit their analysis to a two-dimensional world where the population is continuously and
uniformly distributed on a line and where geographical and preference dimensions coin-
cide. Moreover, their model abstracts from income heterogeneity. Finally, public spending
is considered as an exogenous and essentially fixed variable.3
Over the years, this model has been extended in several directions. Goyal and Staal
(2004) analyze a similar model under the more realistic assumption that the decision to
secede can only be taken at the regional, not the individual, level while also dealing with the
implications of spatially clustered policy preferences. Staal (2004) confirms earlier results
in a model where public spending and taxation exogenously depend on state size. Etro
(2006) goes even further by endogenizing the provision of public goods, subjecting the level
of public spending to majority voting at the country level. Furthermore, he parametrizes
2For an overview of the early literature, see Bolton, Roland, and Spolaore (1996); for an overview of the
more recent literature, see Ruta (2005) and Spolaore (2010).
3For additional criticisms on the AS-framework, see Herrmann-Pillath (2008) and Radax (2009).
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the elasticity of marginal utility from the public good and analyzes how the comparison
of the optimal and the stable equilibrium behaves with respect to this parameter. Radax
(2009) considers the case of non-uniform population distributions and concludes that AS’s
central results are highly sensitive to the choice of population distribution. Staal (2010)
develops a model to analyze how incentives for separation and unification are related
to incentives for public good provision, finding that majority voting could both lead to
excessive separatist tendencies as well as an overprovision of public goods.
A different strand of the literature focuses on the potentially destabilizing effects of
inter-regional income and wealth distribution differentials. An influential paper by BR
analyzes the incentives to secede from the viewpoint of political conflict over redistribution
policies. They demonstrate that, in a two region model, the richer region may have an
incentive to secede to avoid paying tax transfers to the poorer region, but the poorer
region might favor separation as well since this would remove the institutional constraints
to implement a more generous redistribution policy. In addition to limiting their analysis
to the two region case, preference heterogeneity is not explicitly included in their model
while publicly provided and private goods are assumed to be perfect substitutes.
In a multi-country setting, Dagan and Volij (2000) similarly argue that richer individ-
uals are more likely to favor separation in the presence of extensive redistribution policies
induced by higher levels of welfare-state mindedness. Fidrmuc (1999) proposes a dy-
namic version of the model introduced by BR and demonstrates that asymmetric regional
output shocks may drive regional fiscal preferences further apart, thereby increasing the
likelihood of disintegration. Gregorini (2009) analyzes the robustness of the equilibrium
results presented by AS when income inequality is introduced in their model.
Despite this rich theoretical literature on regional instability, empirical applications
remain scarce. One notable exception is Lake and O’Mahony (2004), who relate the
long-term trend in average state size to the general trends in a number of potential de-
terminants but fail to find any clear relationship capable of explaining the incredible rise
and subsequent fall in average state size witnessed in modern history. Desmet, Le Bre-
ton, Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, and Weber (2011) provide another interesting application, connecting
genetic distances among populations to national stability of borders within a theoretical
model of border formation. Calibrating this model enables them to accurately reproduce
the historical order of disintegration of former Yugoslavia into five separate states. Lim-
ited availability of inter-regional genetic distances, however, restricts their exploration of
present-day regional instability to just three European regions. Additionally, their model
abstracts from intra-regional income distributions and does not take heterogeneity in the
intensity of preference for the public good into account.
Finally, this paper is also related to the political science literature surrounding nation-
alism and separatism, where various papers use multi-country panel data on the variation
in the electoral results of separatist and autonomist political parties to tease out the de-
terminants of secessionism in advanced democracies (Fearon & Van Houten, 2002; Sorens,
5
2005, 2008, 2009). This literature tends to confirm the importance of relative regional
aﬄuence, population size, language and ideological differences for the electoral success of
regionalist parties. Similarly, Suesse (2014) exploits regional variation in pro-secessionist
protests to test various economic theories of regional instability, finding strong evidence
for the existence of a trade-off between regional size and two proxies for population het-
erogeneity, but remaining inconclusive with respect to the role of inter-regional income
differences. One advantage of our proposed methodology, however, is that it also permits
the analysis of regional (in)stability in democratic countries lacking politically significant
autonomist movements - or where these movements are prohibited by law.4
3 A theoretical model of state fragmentation
Capitalizing on prior work by Etro (2006) as well as Desmet et al. (2011), this section
draws on the recent economic literature on regional instability to develop a broad model
of state fragmentation. In this model, we consider a world of C countries, indexed by c ∈
{1, . . . , C}, each consisting of two or more regions, indexed by r ∈ {1, . . . , R}. Each region
is inhabited by a population of geographically immobile agents, indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , I},
who derive utility from private consumption, ci, and consumption of the public good, gc.
We follow BR and assume that the decision to separate is made at the regional, rather
than the individual, level.5
Each country, with total national income Yc, has a single government providing public
policy. To keep the model tractable, we only consider a single, non-rival public good, gc,
representing a bundle of policy choices. Public policy is financed through a country-wide
proportional income tax schedule, decided by majority voting. Note that this implies
redistribution, although not in the conventional income sense. Rather, poorer agents
may benefit from increased taxation through an increase in the portfolio of state-provided
services in areas such as health, education or public safety.6 Regions have distinct policy
preferences, dr, such that any deviation from their most preferred policy bundle reduces the
utility their inhabitants derive from the (nationally determined) public good. Therefore,
the utility of agent i residing in region r of country c has the following general functional
form:
Ui,r,c = f(ci, gc, dr) (1)
4Eg. Bulgaria or Turkey.
5The implicit assumption that only a set of predetermined regions can declare independence may be
less unrealistic than at first seems, as the existing administrative infrastructure of countries offers an
institutional framework for subnational identity formation and the articulation of region-specific policy
preferences. In fact, Griffiths (2015, p. 732) argues that “the administrative status of breakaway regions
(or lack thereof) is a strong predictor of secessionist outcomes”, because “internal lines and status cate-
gories reduce bargaining problems between center and periphery; they create conceptual distinctions that
can become salient in the eyes of the relevant parties; and international law emphasizes administrative
territories as a guide for recognizing new states via the principle of uti possidetis (as you possess)”.
6For a similar treatment, see Besley and Coate (1991).
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To obtain closed form results, more specific assumptions are needed. First of all, we will
focus on linear utility from private consumption and isoelastic utility from public spending.
Second, we assume that taxation is non-distortionary, implying that if country c adopts tax
rate tc, the corresponding level of the public good will be tcYc. This simplifying assumption
seems reasonable to the extent that the electorate does not take into account tax distortions
when voting on tax rates. Finally, we assume that the welfare cost associated with the
mismatch between regionally preferred and actually provided public policy is a convexly
decreasing function of dr. This implies that the welfare cost of a further increase in the
distance between regionally preferred and actually provided public policy is itself increasing
in the initial regional preference distance to public policy. Following these assumptions,
an agent with gross income yi has the following utility under the unified country:
Ui,r,c = (1− tc) yi + (1− dr)
δ (tcYc)
θc
θc
(2)
where θc ∈ [0, 1] parametrizes the intensity of preference for the public good7, with larger
values representing a more intense preference for a larger public sector. δ ≥ 0 captures the
intensity of nationalism, where it is clear that rising nationalist sentiments increase the
welfare costs associated with deviations from regionally preferred public good bundles.8
This allows us to explicitly derive the preferred tax rate of any agent i, t∗i,r,c, as
t∗i,r,c =
[
(1− dr)δ
yi
] 1
1−θc
Y
θc
1−θc
c (3)
Individual preferences over tax rates are clearly single peaked, such that the equilibrium
tax rate under majority voting equals the tax rate most preferred by the median tax voter,
m, at the country level.9 Denoting the income level of the national median tax voter by y∗
and the political distinctiveness of his policy preferences by d∗, we can write the prevailing
tax rate in the unified country, t∗c , as
t∗c = t
∗
m,r,c =
[
(1− d∗)δ
y∗
] 1
1−θc
Y
θc
1−θc
c (4)
implying that tax rates are increasing in country size but decreasing in median income
and the distinctiveness of regional policy preferences, broadly consistent with the empirical
findings of Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999), Luttmer (2001) and Amin (2011).
7Technically, θc captures the elasticity of marginal utility from public good consumption, as in Etro (2006).
8For a given regional preference distance to actual public policy, dr, ‘nationalism’ is thus precisely defined
as the weight the electorate attaches to this preference distance. If the electorate doesn’t attach any
importance to the discrepancy between regionally preferred and nationally provided public policy, such
that δ equals zero, nationalism is absent and border stability is independent from the policy choices of
the central government. If a regional electorate is hypersensitive to deviations from its preferred policy
bundle, such that δ approaches infinity, nationalism is absolute in this region and the central government
can only preserve the union by fully tailoring public policy to this specific region’s policy preferences.
9This is a direct implication of the median voter theorem.
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Therefore, the utility of any agent i under the unified country can be rewritten as
Ui,r,c = (1− t∗c) yi +
(1− dr)δ (t∗cYc)θc
θc
(5)
Under separation, this agent ends up in region r ∈ R, where the equilibrium tax rate
t∗r is determined by the regional median tax voter. By a similar chain of reasoning, we can
express this tax rate as a function of the income, y∗∗, of the regional median tax voter:
t∗r =
(
1
y∗∗
) 1
1−θc
Y
θc
1−θc
r (6)
implying that individual utility of any agent i under separation is given by
Ui,r = (1− t∗r) yi +
(t∗rYr)
θc
θc
(7)
This means that any agent i contemplating a move towards the independence of his
region r will prefer separation over preserving the union with country c whenever ∆i,r,c =
Ui,r − Ui,r,c > 0. More specifically, this implies that separation is preferred whenever
∆i,r,c = (t
∗
c − t∗r) yi +
(t∗rYr)
θc − (1− dr)δ (t∗cYc)θc
θc
> 0 (8)
It is easy to see that the net welfare gain of separation is a strictly increasing function
of δ. Substituting for t∗c and t∗r and rearranging terms, we can rewrite the expression
for the net welfare gain of separation experienced by any agent i residing in region r of
country c as a function of its underlying components
∆i,r,c = ϕ1
([
θc
yi
y∗∗
− 1
]{
1−
(
Yr
Yc
) θc
1−θc
}
+ ϕ2
{
1− (1− dr)
δ
(1− d∗)δ
}
+
{
1− y
∗
y∗∗
})
(
+ϕ3
[
1− θcyi
y∗
]{
1− (1− d∗) δ1−θc
(
y∗∗
y∗
) 1
1−θc
}) (9)
where
ϕ1 =
Y
θc
1−θc
c
θcy
∗∗ θc
1−θc
> 0, ϕ2 = (1− d∗)
δ
1−θc
(
y∗∗
y∗
) θc
1−θc ≥ 0 and ϕ3 = y
∗
y∗∗
> 0
A closer inspection of equation (9) reveals that there are four important channels
determining a region’s choice of separation.10
First, the economic cost of separation, reflected in the first term in curly brackets,
corresponds to the economy of scale loss in the provision of public goods. This term
indicates that, except for the richest agents, the incentive to secede is increasing in the
10For more details on the derivations and interpretation of the general model, see appendix A.
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relative size of the region since larger regions are able to retain more economies of scale
under separation. However, a more subtle result lies in the fact that richer agents may even
experience an economic benefit of separation. The intuition behind this result is that a
larger efficiency loss of separation induces a more pronounced post-secession reallocation
towards private spending, such that separation may act an instrument to bring (post-
separation) tax rates more in line with the fiscal preferences of the richest agents.
Proposition 1
If yi <
y∗∗
θc
, ∆i,r,c is increasing in
Yr
Yc
.
If yi >
y∗∗
θc
, ∆i,r,c is decreasing in
Yr
Yc
.
Second, the political gain of separation, reflected in the second term in curly brackets,
captures the welfare gain of a public policy better suited to regional policy preferences.
It is easy to see that an increase in the distinctiveness of own regional policy preferences
unambiguously increases the incentives to secede. Thus, proposition 2 can be seen as the
translation of the welfare benefits of a government closer to the people.
Proposition 2
∆i,r,c is unambiguously increasing in dr.
Note, however, that the political gain of separation also depends on the degree of
preference heterogeneity in the rest of the country. Since a large degree of preference
heterogeneity decreases utility from public policy, an increase in regional political distinc-
tiveness in the rest of the country serves as a mechanism that reduces tax rates. To the
extent that reduced public spending limits the relative importance of carefully tailored gov-
ernment policies, a general increase in preference heterogeneity decreases the political gain
of separation. Whether the existence of preference heterogeneity in the rest of the country
effectively plays a stabilizing role, however, critically depends on fiscal preferences.11
Third, the tax base effect of separation, reflected in the third term in curly brackets,
captures the income differential between the median tax voters at the regional and the
national level. If this differential is positive, there is an additional benefit of separation
since richer regions would no longer need to provide tax transfers to poorer regions in
case of separation. Conversely, if this differential is negative, there is an additional cost of
secession due to the decrease in the tax base.
11More specifically, see proposition 5.
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Proposition 3
If y∗∗ > y∗, there is an additional tax base benefit of separation.
If y∗∗ < y∗, there is an additional tax base cost of separation.
Fourth, the redistributive effect of separation, reflected in the last term in curly brack-
ets, depends on the similarity of fiscal preferences. More specifically, whenever individual
fiscal preferences resonate more with those of the median tax voter at the regional level,
the net welfare gain of separation increases.
Proposition 4
If y∗∗ > y
∗
(1−d∗)δ , ∆i,r,c is increasing in yi.
If y∗∗ < y
∗
(1−d∗)δ , ∆i,r,c decreasing in yi.
Finally, note that the distinctiveness of the policy preferences of the rest of the country
influences both political and redistributive gains of separation. Indeed, the tax-reducing
effect of increased preference heterogeneity in the rest of the country serves as a mechanism
that brings (national) tax rates more in line with the fiscal preferences of the richest strata,
thereby decreasing political as well as redistributive gains of secession for this particular
group. For poorer agents, the stabilizing effect of reducing incongruent government policies
is traded off against their preference for a larger government.
Proposition 5
If yi >
(
(1−dr)δ
(1−d∗)δ
)
y∗, ∆i,r,c is decreasing in d∗.
If yi <
(
(1−dr)δ
(1−d∗)δ
)
y∗, ∆i,r,c is increasing in d∗.
To gain a fuller understanding of the pure political effect, assume that income is
uniformly distributed across the population and public spending is fixed, in which case
the model reverts to the original AS-model:12
∆ASi,r,c =
(tYr)
θc
θc
− {1− dr}δ
{
Yc
Yr
}θc
(10)
In this special case the incentive to secede solely depends on the magnitude of the tax
disadvantage as against the welfare gains of a government closer to the people. It can
be shown that the incentive to secede is unambiguously increasing in the relative size of
the region and the political distinctiveness of own region’s policy preferences, while it is
independent of preference heterogeneity in the rest of the country:
12For more details on the derivations and interpretation of these special cases, see appendix A.3.
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Proposition 6
If yi = y
∗ = y∗∗ = y ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and t∗c = t∗r = t:
∆i,r,c is unambiguously increasing in
Yr
Yc
.
∆i,r,c is unambiguously increasing in dr.
∆i,r,c is independent of d
∗.
Finally, to see the redistributive effect at play, consider the case where there is no
preference heterogeneity such that equation (9) now reduces to the original BR-model:
∆BRi,r,c = ϕ1
([
1− θcyi
y∗
]{
y∗
y∗∗
−
(
y∗
y∗∗
) θc
1−θc
}
+
[
θc
yi
y∗∗
− 1
]{
1−
(
Yr
Yc
) θc
1−θc
}
+
{
1− y
∗
y∗∗
})
(11)
Thus, in this special case, the incentive to secede solely depends on - borrowing their
terminology - the political (cf. redistributive) effect, the efficiency (cf. economic) effect
and the tax base effect. These can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 7
If dR = d
∗ = 0 ∀R ∈ {1, . . . , r}:
If y∗∗ > y∗, ∆i,r,c is increasing in yi.
If yi <
y∗∗
θc
, ∆i,r,c is increasing in
Yr
Yc
.
If y∗∗ > y∗, ∆i,r,c is subject to an additional tax base benefit.
4 A novel index of regional political distinctiveness
The idea of a government policy insufficiently tailored to regional needs as a primary
threat to state stability has a long pedigree in economic thinking on the determinants of
state size and also plays an important role in our model of state fragmentation. Empirical
research on its significance, however, has been complicated by the necessity to quantify
the degree of preference heterogeneity. Traditionally, the literature proxies preference
heterogeneity by the genetic (Desmet et al., 2011), ethno-linguistic (Alesina & Wacziarg,
1998; Lake & O’Mahony, 2004) or cultural (Kaasa, Vadi, & Varblane, 2013) distances
among populations. One drawback is that the supposed link with actual preference het-
erogeneity remains far from clear. In this light, Spolaore (2010, p. 334) contends that
the degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization proxies “only imperfectly for the extent and
intensity of preference heterogeneity that affect the determination of national borders”.
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Similarly, Giuliano, Spilimbergo, and Tonon (2013, p. 17) conclude that “genetic distance
could therefore be largely a proxy for [. . .] geographical impediments, and economists should
be careful when using it as a proxy for vertically transmitted characteristics.”. A second
criticism is that political heterogeneity is a dynamic phenomenon that is subject to sud-
den and large temporal shifts, for instance in reaction to political events. To the extent
that language and genetics are variables that evolve gradually over time, at best, they are
only able to offer an outdated account of the evolution in political heterogeneity. With
respect to ethno-linguistic fractionalization, for instance, Stichnoth and Straeten (2009,
p. 5) worry that “most studies use data on ethno-linguistic groups from the early 1960s to
test hypotheses about the consequences of ethnic diversity in much later periods”. One final
drawback is the often limited temporal availability of data, which complicates the analysis
of long-term trends in political heterogeneity. In this sense, a comprehensive analysis of
long-term trends in the cultural distances between populations remains impossible, as the
large-scale value surveys underlying this approach only came into existence in the 80’s.13
Therefore, this section proposes a novel and more direct indicator of regional prefer-
ence heterogeneity. Departing from the premise that, in a democratic setting, regional
policy preferences translate primarily into regional electoral behavior, we construct an
indicator of regional political distinctiveness based on the discrepancy between regional
and national party preferences. We proceed in two steps. First, we define the political
distance between any two regions as the sum of the absolute differences between the vote
percentages received by each political party contesting elections inside these regions, di-
vided by 2 to eliminate double counting.14 More specifically, when a total of P parties,
indexed by p ∈ {1, . . . , P}, compete in the national election that takes place at time t, the
corresponding political distance between two regions r and s, PDr,s,t, is given by
PDr,s,t =
P∑
p=1
|vp,r,t − vp,s,t|
2
(12)
where vp,r,t denotes the vote percentage for party p in region r at time t.
This index thus summarizes the extent to which party preferences deviate between
regions. It is easy to see that larger weight is given to votes for regionally concentrated
parties, which mechanically increase the value of the index for the corresponding region.
This accords with the conventional wisdom in the political science literature, that region-
ally concentrated parties represent region-specific interests (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982; De
Winter, Gomez-Reion, & Lynch, 2006; Brancati, 2007), implying that the regional vari-
ation in their electoral strength acts like a canary in the coal mine of the existence and
intensity of regionally distinct policy preferences. Note, however, that this indicator does
presuppose a minimal degree of overlap in the political party landscape in each particular
region and the rest of the country in order to be able to estimate meaningful inter-regional
13The first wave of the World Values Survey (2017), for instance, dates back to 1980.
14A similar index is used by Lee (1988) and Hearl, Budge, and Pearson (1996).
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political distances. The absence of this overlap will necessitate the removal of a small
number of interesting regions from the empirical application.15,16
In a second step, we approximate the discrepancy between regionally preferred and
actually provided public policy that arises due to the existence of these inter-regional
political distances by also taking into account the political influence each region has on
the policy-making process. As this influence is primarily related to regional population
size in a democratic context, we define the political distinctiveness experienced by region
r at time t, which we denote by dr,t, as the population-weighted political distance of this
particular region to all other regions in the country
dr,t =
∑
s∈c
qs,tPDr,s,t (13)
where qs,t captures the population share of region s in country c at time t.
As can be seen from this expression, the indicator takes values between 0 and 1 where
higher values indicate a larger gap between regional and national policy preferences. In-
tuitively, this implies that the more a region’s party preferences diverge from those of the
majority in the rest of the country, the larger will be the estimated political distinctiveness
of that region’s policy preferences.
Before employing this index to characterize present-day regional political distinctive-
ness in Europe, as well as its historical evolution, several notes are in order. First, to
calculate these indexes, we only use regional electoral results related to state-wide legisla-
tive elections as these are most closely related to the public policy formulation process.
Second, as a basic rule, regional indexes are calculated at the NUTS 2 level. However,
when the relevant autonomist movements are organized at the more aggregate NUTS 1
level - as is the case in Belgium and the UK - or the more disaggregated NUTS 3 level - as
in Bulgaria - these are taken as the spatial units of interest. Also, in those cases where the
NUTS 2 level corresponds to the entire country itself, the NUTS 3 level is considered in-
stead. Finally, in our effort to place European regional voting distinctiveness in a broader
historic perspective, we also report pre-universal suffrage estimates of the indicator. Al-
though these estimates may not accurately reflect the degree of preference heterogeneity
in the entire population, they do reflect the degree of preference heterogeneity of that part
of the population that is politically salient. We include them to provide a historic per-
spective that is as complete as possible. Taken together, this leaves us with information
on a total of 623 elections in 264 regions of 26 European countries. Appendix C.1 details
the country-specific data construction methods utilized and provides an overview of the
regions and election years included as well as the data sources.
Table 1 summarizes the present-day voting distinctiveness of both the 15 most and
15Including Northern Ireland in the UK, Valle d’Aosta in Italy and A˚land in Finland, see appendix C.1.
16These regions could still be included when computing political distances based on the vote shares accrued
by political party families, as identified by Caramani (2004), or European Parliament groups.
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least distinctive European regions in our sample by relying on the most recent regional
electoral results available for each separate country.17 Unsurprisingly, regions with noto-
riously persistent separatist currents - such as the Basque country, neighboring Navarra
and Catalonia in Spain, the isle of Corsica in France, Scotland in the UK and the pre-
dominantly German-speaking South Tyrol region in Italy - also turn out to be the most
distinctive European regions in political terms. Also featured prominently on this list are
those regions harboring large (ethno-) linguistic minorities, including Bulgaria’s Turkish
minorities in the provinces of Kardzhali, Razgrad and Targovishte, Switzerland’s Italian
speaking minority in Ticino and Estonia’s Russian minority of Kirde-Eesti. Interestingly,
some regions lacking strong regionalist movements nonetheless have voting patterns that
diverge considerably from the rest of the country. For example, the above-average electoral
support for the political left in the Walloon region in Belgium almost puts her on a par
with Spanish Navarra. Hungary, Slovenia and Denmark, on the other hand, show up as
being among the most homogeneous countries in terms of party preferences.
Table 1: Most/least distinct European regions
Most distinct Least distinct
# NUTS Region d̂r # NUTS Region d̂r
1 BG425 Kardzhali 0.573 250 SK04 Eastern Slovakia 0.089
2 PT30 Regia˜o Auto´noma da Madeira 0.561 251 NL22 Gelderland 0.089
3 ES51 Catalun˜a 0.502 252 SE12 East Middle Sweden 0.086
4 PT20 Regia˜o Auto´noma dos Ac¸ores 0.496 253 NL33 Zuid-Holland 0.084
5 ES21 Pa´ıs Vasco 0.483 254 HU32 Northern Great Plain 0.083
6 UKM Scotland 0.481 255 PT11 Norte 0.083
7 FR83 Corse 0.479 256 SI02 Western Slovenia 0.082
8 BG324 Razgrad 0.432 257 SE23 West Sweden 0.082
9 ITH9 Trentino-Alto Adige/Su¨dtirol 0.403 258 DK03 Syddanmark 0.077
10 CH07 Ticino 0.399 259 DK04 Midjylland 0.073
11 BG334 Targovishte 0.318 260 SI01 Eastern Slovenia 0.072
12 EE007 Kirde-Eesti 0.314 261 HU22 Western Transdanubia 0.067
13 ES22 Comunidad Foral de Navarra 0.302 262 HU33 Southern Great Plain 0.061
14 BE1 Brussels-Capital Region 0.294 263 HU23 Southern Transdanubia 0.058
15 BE3 Walloon region 0.263 264 HU21 Central Transdanubia 0.058
Note: This table summarizes the estimates of contemporary regional political distinctiveness, as defined in equation
(13), of the 15 most and least distinctive regions in our sample relying on the most recent electoral data. Information
on the most recent available election years, data construction and sources is provided in section 2 and appendix C.1.
Utilizing historical data on regional electoral results, this methodology moreover allows
us to put European regional preference heterogeneity in a historical perspective. To do
so, we compile an index of regional distinctiveness in Europe which captures the expected
regional distinctiveness experienced by its inhabitants at any given point in time. More
specifically, this corresponds to the population-weighted degree of preference heterogene-
17The full results are reported in table A5.
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ity present in our sample.18 Calculating this composite index based on the full dataset
reveals that regional preference heterogeneity rose considerably during the 19th century,
indicating an increasing vulnerability of European states to the destabilizing effects of
regionalism throughout this period, but that regional policy preferences converged drasti-
cally in the aftermath of World War 2, reaching a low point in the early 70’s. After this
period of convergence, however, the most recent period is characterized by a persistent
increase in regional preference heterogeneity, which resonates with the increasing regional
instability witnessed during the same period. Recomputing this index for a balanced panel
of 14 countries, for which data is consistently available for the postwar period, does not
significantly alter the results.
Figure 1: Regional political distinctiveness in Europe (1832-2015)
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Note: This figure plots the evolution of the expected degree of regional political distinctiveness between
1832 and 2015. Political distinctiveness in non-election years is approximated by linear interpolation at
the regional level.
These results are striking because they differ markedly from earlier results reported by
Lake and O’Mahony (2004), who fail to find empirical evidence for increasing preference
heterogeneity throughout the second half of the 20th century, leading them to exclude
this channel as a potential culprit for the dramatic contemporary decline in average state
size.19 Our indicator, in contrast, tends to confirm the existence of an upward trend in
regional preference heterogeneity in the European context and thus seems better suited to
explain Europe’s rising regionalism over the past 40 years (Newhouse, 1997).
18Data on national population size comes from Madison (2010). Assuming that regional political distinc-
tiveness evolves gradually over time, non-election years are linearly interpolated at the regional level.
19Possibly due to data limitations as cross-national data on ethno-linguistic fractionalization, which they
use as a proxy for preference heterogeneity, was only available for the years 1961 and 1985.
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5 Data and empirical strategy
There are two basic forces in our theoretical model of state fragmentation: one tends to
unite regional populations and the other divides them. Increasing distinctiveness of own
regional policy preferences, for instance, is a force that can drive regions to secede whereas
the benefits arising from economies of scale in the provision of government tend to unite
them. In this section, we discuss how we aim to utilize this model, neatly summarized
in equation (8), to analyze the present-day outcome of this tension between heterogeneity
and efficiency in the provision of government in a European context.20
To understand how this can be done, recall that the net gain of separation is an
increasing function of the intensity of nationalist feelings, captured by the δ-parameter,
since higher values of δ increase the welfare costs of a uniform and nationally determined
public policy. Following Desmet et al. (2011), this implies that we can rank regions
according to the risk they pose to the union by starting from a world in which nationalism
is nonexistent (corresponding to δ = 0), and subsequently progressively increase the value
of δ to check which regions would be the first to break away. To do so, we assume
that the decision to separate is taken by majority voting at the regional level. This
assumption seems reasonable when the central government is unable - or unwilling - to
prevent separation through military means. Our equilibrium notion thus requires from
each partitioning of regions into countries that this partition cannot be improved upon by
any unilateral internal redrawal of borders:
Definition 1
A stable country, c, is a finite collection of regions, r ∈ {1, . . . , R}, such that:
Um,r,c ≥ Um,r ∀ r ∈ c
where m refers to the median voter in region r.
Using this stability concept, we define the most secession-prone regions as those regions
whose integration in the unified country is most sensitive to increasing nationalism. More
specifically, the smaller the region-specific upper bound of δ for which definition 1 is
satisfied, the smaller the extent of nationalist feelings needed for the regional median voter
to favor separation and the more secession-prone the corresponding region. One important
remark is that capital regions are assumed inherently stable due to the additional rents
they derive from their status as capital, which always outweigh any potential welfare gains
of separation (Sorens, 2008).21
20See appendix B for a more concise, graphical description of our empirical strategy.
21That capital regions achieve the highest per capita income ratio’s in a majority of European countries
is testimony to this. Moreover, to our knowledge, there exists no real-world example of a capital region
advocating its separation from the rest of the country.
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Definition 2
For each region, r, let br denote the maximal value of δ for which Um,r,c ≥ Um,r:
br < bs ⇔ region r is more secession-prone than region s.
Similarly, it is easy to see that, at the country-level, definition 1 will hold as long as δ
< br ∀ r ∈ c. This implies that a country becomes more robust to the threat of regional
instability as it becomes less sensitive to a separation from its most secession-prone region.
In other words, the larger the country-specific upper bound of δ for which definition 1 is
satisfied, the more secession-robust the corresponding country.
Definition 3
Let Bc denote the country-specific vector whose r
th component equals br. Let b
∗
c =
min{Bc}:
b∗c > b∗d ⇔ country c is more secession-robust than country d.
To analyze present-day regional (in)stability in Europe in terms of these stability con-
cepts, we calibrate the model to contemporary income, tax and preference heterogeneity
data for the regions under research and then run a series of ‘simulated laboratory experi-
ments’.22 Each experiment starts with a particular, exogenously specified value of δ, which
initially takes a value of 0, and an identical set of simulated participants, residing in one
of the 264 regions listed in table A1, and involves a majority vote on the most preferred
borders in each separate region according to equation (8). In each subsequent simulation
we incrementally increase the value of δ by 0.01, thereby mimicking a general rise in na-
tionalist sentiments throughout Europe, until the first region decides to break away. We
repeat this exercise until we can rank all European regions from most to least secession-
prone under definition 2 and all European countries from most to least secession-robust
according to definition 3.
The parametrization of our model draws on a variety of sources. Most importantly, we
extend a methodology originally developed by Schokkaert and Decancq (2013) to simulate
regional income distributions by converting income data reported by respondents to the
European Social Survey (Norwegian Social Science Data Services, 2016) to their corre-
sponding monetary values. This procedure, detailed in appendix C.2, results in a sample
of 406120 income observations (or ‘simulated participants’), on average 1538 observations
per individual region. To approximate regional preference heterogeneity, we rely on the
appropriate estimates of regional political distinctiveness as defined in equation (13) and
detailed in appendix C.1. The remaining data we need is fairly standard. Total national
and regional income is proxied by Eurostat (2016b) data on national and regional GDP
22To paraphrase Aldy and Smyth (2014).
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while for the tax rate, we use Eurostat (2016a) data on the ratio of government spending
on public goods to total GDP.23 All of this aims to ensure that the parameter values
used in our simulated experiments over thousands of simulated participants resemble their
real-world counterparts as closely as possible.
This leaves us with only one degree of freedom, namely the parameter θc. Lacking
satisfactory estimates of its true value, we prefer to remain agnostic when it comes to its
parametrization. Therefore, each simulation sequence makes use of equation (4) to identify
θc endogenously through our exogenous choice of δ. In a sense, our approach thus boils
down to a series of counterfactual analysis (‘what-if’-scenarios), where we sequentially ver-
ify whether, if a certain parameter value of δ would reflect the true intensity of nationalist
feelings, the corresponding region would secede under equation (8). The smaller the range
of δ for which the answer is ‘no’, the more secession-prone the corresponding region. Table
2 summarizes the data sources used to identify the parameters included in our model, as
well as their economic interpretation.
Table 2: Parameter values, sources and economic interpretation
Parameter Value Source Interpretation
Yc/r National/regional GDP Eurostat (2016b) Total national/regional income
yi Disposible income per capita Appendix C.2 Gross individual income
dr Appendix C.1 Appendix C.1 Regional political distinctiveness
t∗c Spending on public goods to GDP Eurostat (2016a) Prevailing national tax rate
δ Exogenously manipulated - Intensity of nationalist feelings
θc Endogenously identified - Intensity of preference for the public good
Finally, to give a sense of the country-specific estimates of the tastes for government
that arise out of our model, table 3 reports the average parameter values for θc, as well as
their standard errors, for parameter values of δ between between 0 and 0.63. We choose this
specific range for δ because, as discussed in the next section, it is consistent with a stable
map of Europe.24 Our estimates imply that the Scandinavian countries display the most
intense preference for public policy, closely mirroring their traditional characterization as
high-tax high-benefit welfare systems (Kleven, 2014), whereas Eastern European countries
turn out to have the most limited taste for a large public sector.
23Public goods are defined as ‘general public services’, ‘defence’, ‘public order and safety’, ‘economic affairs’
and ‘environment protection’.
24More specifically, when δ equals 0.64, the first region in our sample breaks away, see table 4.
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Table 3: Estimated θc-values
Country θ̂c Country θ̂c Country θ̂c Country θ̂c
Denmark 0.329 (0.001) Slovenia 0.289 (0.000) Hungary 0.272 (0.001) Latvia 0.264 (0.002)
Norway 0.326 (0.001) Ireland 0.289 (0.001) Switzerland 0.272 (0.001) Lithuania 0.245 (0.002)
Finland 0.320 (0.001) Estonia 0.289 (0.001) Portugal 0.272 (0.002) Poland 0.238 (0.001)
Sweden 0.315 (0.001) Greece 0.286 (0.001) Czech Republic 0.270 (0.001) Romania 0.227 (0.001)
Austria 0.313 (0.001) France 0.282 (0.001) Italy 0.268 (0.001) Bulgaria 0.226 (0.002)
Belgium 0.306 (0.002) United Kingdom 0.281 (0.002) Slovakia 0.268 (0.001)
Netherlands 0.299 (0.001) Germany 0.277 (0.001) Spain 0.264 (0.002)
Note: This table summarizes the country-specific average θc estimates and their standard errors, when θc
is estimated through equation (4) and δ is incrementally increased from 0 to 0.63 (see discussion section
5).
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6 Results
Figure 2, then, visualizes what the current map of Europe looks like when viewed at
through the lens of our theoretical model of state fragmentation. More specifically, this
map illustrates the spatial heterogeneity in regional (in)stability by highlighting the most
secession-prone regions in the darkest green while depicting the most secession-robust
regions in white. Perhaps, the first thing to notice on this figure is that simulated sensitiv-
ity to regional demand for autonomy effectively varies quite extensively across European
countries. Most notably, in Western Europe there appears to be a discontinuous corri-
dor of relatively strong and widespread separatist potential, stretching from Galicia over
the Basque country to Catalun˜a in Spain, continuing in French Corsica and the Italian
and Swiss Alps, following its way through Eastern Germany and Belgium before finally
crossing the North Sea to end in Scotland. In Eastern Europe, sensitivity to secessionist
demand is more diffuse and seems primarily tied up with the Russian minorities in Latvia
and Lithuania, the Hungarian minority in Romania’s Transylvanic region and the Turkish
minorities in Bulgaria’s northern and southern oblasts.
Figure 2: Regional (in)stability in Europe
Note: This figure visualizes the information reported in table A6, highlighting the most secession-prone
regions in the darkest green and the least secesssion-prone regions in white. Excluded countries are
highlighted in light gray, excluded regions in hatched white and capital regions in dotted black.
In interpreting this figure, note that the heightened sensitivity towards secessionist
tendencies in a number of Western European countries seems to be in line with their
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enduring processes of decentralization. In Belgium, for instance, the existence of such
sensitivity would explain its historical process of evolutionary federalism that continues
to this day, described by some as an infinitely repeated game between the north and the
south which essentially turns Belgium into “a quasi-empty shell” (Gerard, 2014, p. 272).
In the UK, it would explain why, in the wake of Alex Salmond’s referendum defeat, more
than 100 English councils demanded that more powers be devolved from Westminster,
adding that “it’s Englands turn now” (BBC, 2014). In Spain, it would explain the recent
Catalan demand for fiscal autonomy and why Rajoy’s subsequent refusal to accommodate
this demand resulted in plans for a Catalan independence referendum (Mart´ı, 2013).
A more detailed view on our most important results is offered in table 4, which lists the
15 most secession-prone European regions against its 15 most secession-robust territories.25
As can be seen, Catalun˜a, Flanders and the Basque country are the regions currently most
likely to break away in a context of rising nationalist sentiments. Consistent with these
results, two of regions recently took steps to organize explicit independence referenda26,
while the statutes of the currently largest political party in Belgium clearly state an
independent Flemish state as its final objective (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, 2015).
Table 4: Most/least secession-prone European regions
Most secession-prone Least secession-prone
# NUTS Region b̂r # NUTS Region b̂r
1 ES51 Catalun˜a 0.64 . . . . . .
2 BE2 Flemish region 0.84 224 DK02 Sjælland 9.85
3 ES21 Pa´ıs Vasco 0.96 225 CH06 Zentralschweiz 10.14
4 UKM Scotland 1.12 226 EL53 Dytiki Makedonia 10.74
5 BG425 Kardzhali 1.29 227 EL54 Ipeiros 10.76
6 PT30 Regia˜o Auto´noma da Madeira 1.36 228 EL61 Thessalia 10.90
7 ITH9 Trentino-Alto Adige/Su¨dtirol 1.46 229 EL64 Sterea Ellada 10.95
8 BE3 Walloon region 1.53 230 HU33 Southern Great Plain 11.00
9 FR83 Corse 1.57 231 HU21 Central Transdanubia 12.05
10 BG324 Razgrad 1.88 232 EL41 Voreio Aigaio 12.14
11 RO12 Centru 1.95 233 CH02 Espace Mittelland 12.46
12 EE007 Kirde-Eesti 2.02 234 EL62 Ionia Nisia 12.48
13 PT20 Regia˜o Auto´noma dos Ac¸ores 2.07 235 CH05 Ostschweiz 13.44
14 ITC4 Lombardia 2.17 236 NL23 Flevoland 13.83
15 LV005 Latgale 2.39 237 HU23 Southern Transdanubia 14.37
. . . . . . 238 CH03 Nordwestschweiz 16.24
Note: This table lists the 15 most and least secession-prone regions in Europe, according to the stability
concept summarized in definition 2. For the full results, see table A6.
The top of this list also contains a number of other notorious separatist and autonomist
regions: Scotland, which held its own independence referendum just two years ago; Corsica,
25The full numerical results are listed in table A6.
26The Basque country in 2008, Catalun˜a in 2014.
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a well-known example of violent separatism where separatist groups retorted to bombing
campaigns to advocate greater autonomy for the island; and the Northern-Italian regions
of Su¨dtirol and Lombardia, where the Euro-crisis is believed to have fueled separatist
demands which even led the South Tyrolean Economics Minister to propose that South
Tyrol “buys its freedom” from Italy, demanding “full autonomy” in return (Spiegel, 2012).
Moreover, our results also shed some light on strong popular demand for regional
autonomy in the under-researched Eastern European area. Examples include Bulgaria’s
Turkish minorities in Razgrad and Kardzhali, where separatist demonstrations in 2012
provoked Bulgarian nationalists to demand that the ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights
and Freedoms (DPS) be declared unconstitutional (Novitine, 2012).27 Another example
is the Hungarian minority in the Romanic Transylvanic region, a region passed back and
forth between Hungary and Romania four times the last century and regarded by each
as national territory, where the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR)
recently held unofficial referendums on territorial autonomy in three of its eastern districts
(Koszorus, 2009).28 Similarly, in Estonia’s Kirde-Eesti region, where the Russian popula-
tion constitutes close to 75% of the total population, a vote in favor of autonomy in 1993
was halted by the Estonian state, making it “wary of losing its grip on sovereignty within
EU integration” (Aalto, 2006, p. 72).
Turning to the other extreme, Nordwestschweiz in Switzerland turns out to be the
European region that is currently the least likely to secede, followed by Hungarian Southern
Transdanubia and Dutch Flevoland. Other countries well represented in the bottom of
this list include Greece and Denmark.
Finally, we can use these region-specific results to characterize the robustness to in-
creasing nationalism of all of the countries under research. As discussed in the previous
section, this can be done by ranking countries on their sensitivity to the secession of their
most secession-prone region. The results, detailed in table 5, illustrate that, according to
this measure, Spain, Belgium and the United Kingdom rank as currently being the most
sensitive to regional instability whereas Denmark, Hungary and Slovenia show up as the
most secession-robust countries in Europe.
27Two years earlier, the leader of the Bulgarian-nationalist Ataka party claimed that “there is a serious
threat that the Kardhzali district could be separated from Bulgaria” (Novitine, 2010).
28Interestingly, the chairman of the UDMR recently stated that “the independence of Kosovo is a precedent
that all EU countries with an ethnic minority should pursue” (Spiegel, 2008).
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Table 5: Least/most secession-robust European countries
Least secession-robust Most secession-robust
# Country Most sensitive region B̂c # Country Most sensitive region B̂c
1 Spain Catalun˜a 0.64 14 Germany Bayern 3.15
2 Belgium Flemish region 0.84 15 Poland Podkarpackie 3.43
3 United Kingdom Scotland 1.12 16 Ireland West 3.61
4 Bulgaria Kardzhali 1.29 17 Switzerland Ticino 3.82
5 Portugal Regia˜o Auto´noma da Madeira 1.36 18 Sweden Upper Norrland 4.46
6 Italy Trentino-Alto Adige/Su¨dtirol 1.46 19 Netherlands Groningen 4.85
7 France Corse 1.57 20 Greece Kriti 4.90
8 Romania Centru 1.95 21 Austria Steiermark 4.98
9 Estonia Kirde-Eesti 2.02 22 Czech republic Moravsosleszko 5.03
10 Latvia Latgale 2.39 23 Norway Agder and Rogaland 5.15
11 Lithuania Kaunas County 2.54 24 Slovenia Eastern Slovenia 5.27
12 Finland Pohjois- ja Ita¨-Suomi 2.64 25 Hungary Northern Hungary 7.67
13 Slovakia Western Slovakia 2.95 26 Denmark Syddanmark 7.83
Note: This table ranks European countries from least to most secession-robust, according to the stability
concept summarized in definition 3.
7 Conclusion
This paper draws on key insights from the existing literature on regional (in)stability
to analyze the political and economical forces that shape regional incentives to secede.
Tracing the interrelations between these forces in a model that is considerably broader than
usual, we largely confirm existing findings but also point out potential stabilizing effects of
preference heterogeneity. The intuition behind the latter is that preference heterogeneity
in the rest of the country, by reducing the utility derived from public policy, serves as
a mechanism lowering national tax rates thereby reducing the fiscal gains of separation
for the wealthy. To apply the model, a subsequent section proposes a novel indicator of
regional political distinctiveness which captures the extent of regionally deviating policy
preferences as the discrepancy between regional and national electoral behavior. It is
shown that, according to this measure, European regional preference heterogeneity has
persistently intensified over the past 40 years, which may explain the rise in European
regionalism that took place within the same time frame. Finally, this paper is the first
to validate the empirical implications of this theoretical framework for a broad set of
European regions. We illustrate how, on the whole, our results tend more to confirm than
to contradict our theoretical model of state fragmentation, lending further credibility to its
capacity of explaining spatial heterogeneity in regional (in)stability in a European context.
While our analysis suggests that good knowledge on regional income distributions and
regional electoral behavior already allows an unknowledgeable outsider to get an accurate
sense on the spatial distribution of separatist potential at a certain point in time, the
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analysis could be refined to yield a more insightful and powerful assesment of regional
(in)stability. In particular, three fruitful future research avenues come to mind.
First, one drawback of the model is that it analyzes border stability only from the
perspective of the region contemplating a move towards independence. More specifically,
the current version of the model abstracts from potential military or other counterreac-
tions from other relevant actors such as the central government, neighboring countries or
supranational actors such as the European Union or NATO. In this sense, the current
analysis only maps the implications of the contemporary literature on state formation for
a status quo scenario that assumes inter alia that newly independent European countries
would preserve access to the European common market and the defensive capabilities of
the mother country. As mentioned earlier, a large body of research nevertheless maintains
that both domestic institutions as well as the international context have a big impact on
the pros and cons of regional independence, potentially introducing a discrepancy between
simulated and real-world secession proneness. Therefore, extending the model to account
for the relative importance of the international system should paint a more accurate geo-
graphical picture of separatist sensitivities in Europe. In the same vein, the recent Catalan
debacle illustrates how the assumption of regions unilaterally deciding on their most pre-
ferred borders may not hold in practice, such that it would be interesting to verify the
robustness of the results with respect to alternative domestic political arrangements. More
specifically, it could be interesting to investigate to what extent a democratic central gov-
ernment could increase secession-robustness by imposing alternative decision mechanisms,
such as subjecting the decision to separate to a country-wide, as opposed to a regional, in-
dependence referendum.29 Incorporating the decentralized structure of government would
connect our model to the literature on (fiscal) decentralization and consociationalism and
shed some light on the stability-enhancing potential of the decentralization route.
Second, another potential shortcoming is that the current version of the model does
not pay any attention to factors that may make political and fiscal preferences converge or
diverge over time. Changing expectations on regional economic growth potential, future
election outcomes or the economic effects of declaring independence could nonetheless
profoundly affect separatist tendencies. Another fruitful research avenue would therefore
be to making this static model dynamic, to analyze how differential (expected) growth
rates or asymmetrical shocks influence regional incentives to separate.
Third, one more general issue is the lack of a systematic statistical validation of these
various theoretical models of state formation. Indeed, the proposed simulation model only
maps the empirical implications of existing theories of state breakup for the current map
of Europe, yet remains silent on the degree of uncertainty of the results. Therefore, mak-
ing this deterministic model probabilistic would serve to assess the degree of uncertainty
29Note that the central government in Madrid declared the Catalan independence referendum uncon-
stitutional, claiming that under the 1978 constitution “all Spaniards must be consulted on issues of
sovereignty” (Washington Post, 2014).
24
associated with the here-mentioned channels of regional (in)stability. In this regard, it
would be interesting to verify how the various regional characteristics laid out in the basic
model influenced the probability to vote ‘yes’ in those regions participating in the recent
independence referendums in Scotland and Catalonia.
25
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A Decomposing the net gain of independence
The general expression for the net gain of secession summarized in equation (8) makes it difficult to identify which channels primarily
determine the decision to secede. This section demonstrates how this general expression can be decomposed into its underlying components.
Subsequently, it relies on this decomposition to identify and interpret the primary channels determining the incentives to secede. Finally, it
demonstrates that both the AS-model, which abstracts from income heterogeneity, and the BR-model, which ignores heterogeneity in policy
preferences, are two special cases of this more general model.
A.1 Decomposition
Starting from equation (8), we had that
∆i,r,c = (t
∗
c − t∗r) yi +
(t∗rYr)
θc − (1− dr)δ (t∗cYc)θc
θc
(14)
Substituting for the expressions of the national and regional tax rates, summarized in equations (4) and (6) respectively, we can rewrite this
as
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By letting D = 1y∗y∗∗ , we can write
= A
(
C +D
(
Y
θc
1−θc
c y
∗ 1
1−θc y∗∗ − (1− d∗) δθc1−θc Y
θc
1−θc
c y
∗y∗∗
1
1−θc + θc (1− d∗)
δ
1−θc Y
θc
1−θc
c y
∗∗ 1
1−θc yi − θcY
θc
1−θc
r y
∗ 1
1−θc yi
))
+AD
(
Y
θc
1−θc
c y
∗ 1
1−θc y∗ − Y
θc
1−θc
c y
∗ 1
1−θc y∗
)
= A
(
C +D
(
Y
θc
1−θc
c y
∗ 1
1−θc [y∗∗ − y∗] + θcyiy∗
1
1−θc
[
Y
θc
1−θc
c − Y
θc
1−θc
r
]
+ Y
θc
1−θc
c y
∗ 1
1−θc [y∗ − θcyi] + (1− d∗)
δθc
1−θc Y
θc
1−θc
c y
∗∗ 1
1−θc
[
(1− d∗)δ θcyi − y∗
]))
Substituting for C and D, we get that
= A
y∗ θc1−θc [Y θc1−θcr − Y θc1−θcc ]+ (1− d∗) δθc1−θc Y θc1−θcc y∗∗ θc1−θc [1− (1− dr)δ]+ Y
θc
1−θc
c y
∗ θc
1−θc
y∗∗
[y∗∗ − y∗] + θcyiy
∗ θc
1−θc
y∗∗
[
Y
θc
1−θc
c − Y
θc
1−θc
r
]
+Y θc1−θcc y∗ θc1−θc
y∗∗
[y∗ − θcyi] + (1− d
∗)
δθc
1−θc Y
θc
1−θc
c y
∗∗ θc
1−θc
y∗
[
(1− d∗)δ θcyi − y∗
]
= A (Ycy
∗)
θc
1−θc
[1− θc yi
y∗∗
]Y θc1−θcr
Y
θc
1−θc
c
− 1
+ [1− y∗
y∗∗
]
+
y∗ − θcyi
y∗∗
+ (1− d∗) δθc1−θc
(
y∗∗
y∗
) θc
1−θc [
1− (1− dr)δ
]
+
(1− d∗) δθc1−θc y∗∗ θc1−θc
y∗
1
1−θc
[
(1− d∗)δ θcyi − y∗
]
= A (Ycy
∗)
θc
1−θc
[1− θc yi
y∗∗
]Y θc1−θcr
Y
θc
1−θc
c
− 1
+ [1− y∗
y∗∗
]
+
y∗ − θcyi
y∗∗
+
(1− d∗) δθc1−θc y∗∗ θc1−θc
y∗
1
1−θc
[
y∗ − (1− dr)δ y∗
]
+
(1− d∗) δθc1−θc y∗∗ θc1−θc
y∗
1
1−θc
[
(1− d∗)δ θcyi − y∗
]
+A (Ycy
∗)
θc
1−θc
(
(1− d∗) δθc1−θc y∗∗ θc1−θc
y∗
1
1−θc
[
(1− d∗)δ y∗ − (1− d∗)δ y∗
])
33
= A (Ycy
∗)
θc
1−θc
[1− θc yi
y∗∗
]Y θc1−θcr
Y
θc
1−θc
c
− 1
+ [1− y∗
y∗∗
]
+
y∗ − θcyi
y∗∗
+
(1− d∗) δθc1−θc y∗∗ θc1−θc
y∗
1
1−θc
[
(1− d∗)δ [θcyi − y∗] + y∗
[
(1− d∗)δ − (1− dr)δ
]]
= A (Ycy
∗)
θc
1−θc
[1− θc yi
y∗∗
]Y θc1−θcr
Y
θc
1−θc
c
− 1
+ [1− y∗
y∗∗
]
+ (y∗ − θcyi)
[
1
y∗∗
− (1− d
∗)
δ
1−θc y∗∗
θc
1−θc
y∗
1
1−θc
]
+ (1− d∗) δ1−θc
(
y∗∗
y∗
) θc
1−θc
[
1− (1− dr)
δ
(1− d∗)δ
]
= A (Ycy
∗)
θc
1−θc
[1− θc yi
y∗∗
]Y θc1−θcr
Y
θc
1−θc
c
− 1
+ [1− y∗
y∗∗
]
+ (1− d∗) δ1−θc
(
y∗∗
y∗
) θc
1−θc
[
1− (1− dr)
δ
(1− d∗)δ
]
+
(
1− θc yi
y∗
)[
y∗
y∗∗
− (1− d∗) δ1−θc
(
y∗∗
y∗
) θc
1−θc
]
= A (Ycy
∗)
θc
1−θc
[1− θc yi
y∗∗
]Y
θc
1−θc
r
Y
θc
1−θc
c
− 1
+
{
1− y
∗
y∗∗
}
+ (1− d∗) δ1−θc
{
y∗∗
y∗
} θc
1−θc
[
1− (1− dr)
δ
(1− d∗)δ
]
(
+
(
y∗
y∗∗
)(
1− θc yi
y∗
)[
1− (1− d∗) δ1−θc
(
y∗
y∗∗
) 1
1−θc
])
Finally, letting ϕ1 =
Y
θc
1−θc
c
θcy
∗∗ θc
1−θc
> 0, ϕ2 = (1− d∗)
δ
1−θc
(
y∗∗
y∗
) θc
1−θc ≥ 0 and ϕ3 = y∗y∗∗ > 0 allows us to rewrite expression 8 as
∆i,r,c = ϕ1
([
θc
yi
y∗∗
− 1
]{
1−
(
Yr
Yc
) θc
1−θc
}
+
{
1− y
∗
y∗∗
}
+ ϕ2
{
1− (1− dr)
δ
(1− d∗)δ
}
+ ϕ3
[
1− θc yi
y∗
]{
1− (1− d∗) δ1−θc
(
y∗∗
y∗
) 1
1−θc
})
34
A.2 Interpretation
Equation (9) identifies four important determinants of regional incentives to secede: an
economic cost of separation, induced by a loss in economies of scale; a political gain of
separation, attained by the move towards a government closer to the people; a tax base
effect, which depends on the income differential between the national and regional median
voters; and a redistributive effect, which critically hinges on the similarity of individual
fiscal preferences and those of the regional and national median voters.
∆i,r,c = ϕ1

[
θc
yi
y∗∗
− 1
] economic cost︷ ︸︸ ︷{
1−
(
Yr
Yc
) θc
1−θc
}
+ϕ2
political gain︷ ︸︸ ︷{
1− (1− dr)
δ
(1− d∗)δ
}
+
tax base effect︷ ︸︸ ︷{
1− y
∗
y∗∗
}
+ϕ3
[
1− θcyi
y∗
]{
1− (1− d∗) δ1−θc
(
y∗∗
y∗
) 1
1−θc
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
redistributive effect

The economic cost of separation is driven by the economy of scale loss in the provision of
government induced by declaring independence. Noting that, by assumption,
(
Yr
Yc
) θc
1−θc < 1,
this efficiency loss of separation entails differing welfare effects for poorer and richer agents.
Hence agents with income levels yi not exceeding
y∗∗
θc
, such that θc
yi
y∗∗ − 1 ≤ 0, experience
an economy of scale cost of separation which is decreasing in the relative size of the region,
Yr
Yc
. For this reason, except for the richest agents, the incentives to secede are increasing
regional size. A more subtle effect is that for agents with income levels exceeding y
∗∗
θc
,
the economy of scale loss of separation translates into a net economic gain of separation.
The intuition behind this result is that the efficiency loss of separation induces a post-
independence reallocation towards private spending, bringing post-independence tax rates
more in line with their fiscal preferences. That secession may function as an instrument to
curb tax pressures also explains the slightly counter-intuitive implication that incentives
to secede are decreasing in the size of the future state for the richest agents.
The political gain of separation captures the welfare gain of a government closer to
the people. Recalling that ϕ2 ≥ 0, it is easy to see that an increase in the distinctive-
ness of the own region’s policy preferences, dr, unambiguously increases the incentive to
secede. Note, however, that the political gain of secession is decreasing in the degree of
preference heterogeneity in the rest of the country, d∗. Indeed, the tax-reducing effect of
increasing preference heterogeneity in the rest of the country30 may serve as a mechanism
to neutralize the political gain of secession, by reducing the total amount of resources that
potentially flow to unwanted government programs. Whether the presence of preference
30Stemming from the reduction in the utility derived from public good consumption, see equation (4).
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heterogeneity in the rest of the country effectively reduces incentives to secede, however,
critically depends on fiscal preferences, as we will discuss below.
The tax base effect of separation, then, captures the income differential between the
median tax voters at the regional and the national levels. When this differential is positive,
there is an additional benefit of separation since richer regions would no longer need to
provide tax transfers to poorer regions post-secession. When this differential is negative,
there is an additional cost of separation due to the adverse impact on the tax base.
The redistributive effect of separation, finally, depends on the similarity of fiscal pref-
erences. Whenever the income level of the regional median tax voter sufficiently lies
above the income level of the national median tax voter, such that y∗∗ > y
∗
(1−d∗)δ , the net
gain of secession is increasing in individual income, yi, while the opposite is true when
y∗∗ < y
∗
(1−d∗)δ . In other words, when individual fiscal preferences most closely resemble
those of the regional median tax voter, there is an additional fiscal benefit of separation.
Interestingly, this redistributive effect also depends on the presence of preference hetero-
geneity in the country, d∗, which puts a downward pressure on national tax rates. For
rich agents (yi ≥ y∗θc ), the degree of preference heterogeneity in the unified country plays
a stabilizing role by bringing national tax rates more in line with their fiscal preferences,
decreasing their net gain of separation. In contrast, a general rise in preference hetero-
geneity increases the gain of separation for poor agents (yi ≤ y∗θc ), by further increasing
the discrepancy between their preferred and actual government size in the unified country.
Note that preference heterogeneity in the rest of the country thus reduces both political
as well as redistributive gains of separation for the richest agents, while poorer agents
trade of the potentially beneficial effects of reducing incongruent, nationally determined
government policies against their preference for more government intervention. More
specifically, note that the contribution of country-level preference heterogeneity, d∗, to the
incentive to secede turns negative whenever
∂∆i,r,c
∂d∗ < 0 or, equivalently,
∂
([
(1−d∗)δ
y∗
] 1
1−θc
Y
θc
1−θc
c −
[
1
y∗∗
] 1
1−θc Y
θc
1−θc
r
)
yi +
([
Yr
y∗∗
] 1
1−θc
)θc
−(1−dr)δ
[(1−d∗)δYc
y∗
] 1
1−θc
θc
θc
∂d∗
< 0
δ
1− θc
(1− d∗) δ−1+θc1−θc
y∗
1
1−θc
Y
θc
1−θc
c yi (−1)− δθc
1− θc
(1− dr)δ (1− d∗)
δθc−1+θc
1−θc Y
θc
1−θc
c
θcy
∗ θc
1−θc
(−1) < 0
δ (1− d∗) δ−1+θc1−θc Y
θc
1−θc
c
(1− θc) y∗
1
1−θc
(
(1− dr)δ (1− d∗)
δθc−δ
1−θc y∗ − yi
)
< 0
yi >
(
1− dr
1− d∗
)δ
y∗
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A.3 Special cases
It is useful to point out that this broad model of state fragmentation encompasses several
existing models as special cases. To see this, first consider the seminal AS-model, which
abstracts both from income heterogeneity as well as differing fiscal preferences and derives
optimal state size as the result of a trade-off of scale economies against heterogeneity costs.
In the context of our model, assuming income heterogeneity plays no role in determining
regional incentives to secede boils down to assuming that yi = y
∗ = y∗∗ = y, while ignoring
the potential relevance of differing fiscal preferences is achieved by exogenizing tax rates,
such that t∗c = t∗∗r = t. In this special case, equation (8) reverts to the AS-model since
∆ASi,r,c = (t− t) y +
(tYr)
θc − (1− dr)δ (tYc)θc
θc
=
(tYr)
θc − (1− dr)δ (tYc)θc
θc
=
(tYr)
θc
θc
[
1− (1− dr)δ
(
tYc
tYr
)θc]
Such that, by letting ϕ4 =
(tYr)
θc
θc
> 0, we obtain that
∆ASi,r,c = ϕ4 − {1− dr}δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
political gain
{
Yc
Yr
}θc
︸ ︷︷ ︸
economic cost
It is easy to verify that the incentive to secede is now unambiguously increasing in
the relative size of the region, YrYc , as well as in the own region’s degree of preference
heterogeneity, dr, but independent of the degree of preference heterogeneity in the rest of
the country, consistent with the prior findings of AS.
As noted in section 1, this basic AS-model has been extended in several directions. To
demonstrate how these extensions can be incorporated, consider the important contribu-
tion of endogenizing tax rates in the original AS-model31, which allows to account for the
potentially destabilizing effect of differing fiscal views. To understand the ramifications of
this extension, we suitably adapt the basic AS-model by endogenizing tax rates32, finding
that
∆AS,t
∗
i,r,c =
(1− d∗) δ1−θc Y θc1−θcc − Y θc1−θcr
y
1
1−θc
 y + Y θc1−θcr − (1− dr)δ (1− d∗) δθc1−θc Y θc1−θcc
θcy
θc
1−θc
31See, for instance, Goyal and Staal (2004) and Etro (2006, Appendix B).
32In line with most of this literature, we still abstract from income heterogeneity.
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θcy
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δ
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1−θc
c − θcY
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1−θc
r + Y
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θc
1−θc
c
]
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1
θcy
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θc (1− d∗)
δ
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δθc
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+ (1− d∗) δ1−θc
[
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δ
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[
+ (1− θc)
[
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Subsequently, by letting ϕ5 =
Y
θc
1−θc
c
θcy
> 0, ϕ6 = (1− θc)
(
Yr
Yc
) θc
1−θc ≥ 0, ϕ7 = (1− d∗)
δ
1−θc ≥
0 and ϕ8 = (1− θc) ≥ 0, we arrive at
∆AS,t
∗
i,r,c = ϕ5
ϕ6
{
1−
(
Yc
Yr
) θc
1−θc
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
economic cost
+ϕ7
{
1− (1− dr)
δ
(1− d∗)δ
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
political gain
+ϕ8
{
1− (1− d∗)δ
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
redistributive effect

In line with the basic AS-model, there is an economic cost of separation, which is
unambiguously decreasing in relative regional size (Y rYc ), as well as a political gain of
separation, which is unambiguously increasing in the degree of preference heterogeneity
present in the own region (dr). In contrast to the basic model, however, the introduction of
endogenous taxation implies that the net gain of separation now also depends on the degree
of preference heterogeneity in the rest of the country, d∗. More specifically, agents now
trade off the discrepancy between actual and preferred government size that arises due to
regionally differing levels of preference heterogeneity against the beneficial effect of reduced
public spending, which decreases the relative importance of regionally tailored public
policy altogether. Finally, note that this framework still abstracts from any heterogeneity
in income, explaining the absence of any tax base effect.
Alternatively, the BR-model ignores heterogeneity in policy preferences and focuses
on redistributive conflicts as a potential source of secessionist tendencies, revealing inter-
regional income distribution differentials as the primary force driving regional instability.
In the absence of preference heterogeneity, which implies that d∗ = dr = 0, equation (9)
reverts to the BR-model summarized by
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∆BRi,r,c = ϕ1

[
1− θcyi
y∗
]{
y∗
y∗∗
−
(
y∗
y∗∗
) θc
1−θc
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
political effect
+
[
θc
yi
y∗∗
− 1
]{
1−
(
Yr
Yc
) θc
1−θc
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
efficiency effect
+
{
1− y
∗
y∗∗
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax base effect

Borrowing their terminology, absent preference heterogeneity, regional incentives to
secede depend only on a political effect, an efficiency effect and a tax base effect. The
political effect, partially reflected in the first term, crucially depends on the similarity in
fiscal preferences such that incentives to secede are increasing in individual income, yi,
whenever the income level of the regional median tax voter exceeds that of the national
median tax voter, y∗∗ > y∗. In addition, the efficiency effect implies that for the majority
of the population, namely those agents with income levels below y
∗∗
θc
, the efficiency loss
of separation (YrYc ) increases the secession cost. The presence of income heterogeneity also
induces a tax base effect: whenever y∗∗ < y∗, there is an additional cost of separation due
to the reduction in the tax base.
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B Graphical intuition of the simulation model of state breakup
This appendix provides a graphical description of the main intuition behind the simulation
approach to rank regions according to the risk they pose to border stability that is outlined
in section 5. To do so, the black lines in figure A1 describe how the net welfare gain of
independence, ∆i,r,c, for the median voters living in two fictitious regions, R1 and R2,
whose votes would be decisive in an independence referendum organized in their respective
region, increase with the intensity of nationalism, δ. Note that regional independence
becomes welfare-increasing whenever this net welfare gain becomes positive and exceeds
the dashed zero-line.
Figure A1: A simulation model of state fragmentation
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Note: This figure shows how the net welfare gain of independence, ∆i,r,c, increases with nationalism, δ,
for the median voters of two fictitious regions, R1 and R2. The ‘fixed’ impact of secession is not affected
by regionalism and amounts to the sum of the economic cost of separation (EC) and the tax base effect
of separation (TB). The ‘variable’ impact of secession depends on nationalism and amounts to the sum of
the political gain of separation (PG) and the redistributive effect of separation (RE). As the median voter
in the first region is the first to experience a positive welfare gain of independence, namely whenever δ is
exceeds the critical threshold of δ∗R1 , he inhabits the most secession-prone region.
As can be seen, the net welfare gain of independence of both median voters unam-
biguously increases as their discontent with the discrepancy between regionally preferred
and nationally provided public policy increases with the δ-parameter. The median voter
in the first region experiences a net welfare gain of independence whenever the value of
the δ-parameter exceeds the critical threshold of δ∗R1 . In other words, declaring indepen-
dence is welfare-increasing for the majority of the population in the first region whenever
δ > δ∗R1 . In the second region, the value of this critical threshold, δ
∗
R2
, is considerably
higher. This second region therefore requires greater discontent with the discrepancy be-
tween regionally preferred and nationally provided public policy, or stronger nationalism,
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to induce its median voter to vote in favor of independence. As a simultaneous increase
in nationalism, captured by a gradual increase in the δ-parameter, will first lead the first
region to declare independence, it is labeled as the most secession-prone of both regions.
Finally, it is crucial to see that the shape of the curves describing the net welfare
gain of independence of both median voters (∆∗R1 and ∆
∗
R2
) critically depend on the
channels discussed in section 3. To further illustrate this, figure A1 distinguishes the ‘fixed’
welfare impact of secession that is inevitably incurred when declaring independence from
the ‘variable’ welfare impact, which depends on the intensity of nationalism as captured
by the δ-parameter. As can be seen, the fixed welfare impact of secession is equal to
the sum of the economic cost of separation (EC) and the tax base effect of separation
(TB) but is not affected by the discrepancy between regionally preferred and nationally
determined public policy, dr. Graphically, its magnitude coincides with the intersection
of the independence-gain-curve (∆∗Rx) and the vertical axis and increases if regions give
up more economies of scale or income transfers when declaring independence. In figure
A1, the fixed welfare impact of secession is identical in both regions. This fixed impact
of secession could nevertheless be overcompensated by the variable impact of secession,
which is equal to the sum of the political gain of separation (PG) and the redistributive
effect of separation (RE) and is dependent of the intensity of nationalism. Graphically,
the relation between the variable impact of secession and nationalism is described by the
curvature of the independence-gain-curve, which becomes steeper in regions with more
distinct policy preferences and income distributions. In other words, when their discontent
with the nationally determined redistributive and other public policy increases with the
δ-parameter, the fixed welfare cost of independence shrinks fastest in those regions whose
income distributions and political preferences most strongly differ from the national trend.
In this sense, the steeper curvature of the independence-gain-curve of the first region
indicates that its income distribution and its policy preferences more strongly diverge
from the national trend, translating in a greater secession-proneness in a context of rising
nationalism, or δ∗R1 < δ
∗
R2
.
41
C Data construction and sources
To analyze spatial heterogeneity in regional (in)stability in Europe in terms of the theoret-
ical model outlined in equation (8), we calibrate its parameters to reflect the contemporary
economic situation in the regions involved as closely as possible. This appendix first de-
tails how we quantify the political distinctiveness of regional policy preferences, which are
defined in equation (13), and subsequently outlines the procedure followed to simulate re-
gional income distributions. Data sources of the other variables involved in our empirical
application are listed in table 2.
C.1 Regional political distinctiveness
To characterize the historical evolution of the territorial structuring of party voting behav-
ior in Europe, we draw on a wide variety of electoral resources and population statistics
to ensure a time series that is as complete as possible. This section first describes in more
detail how historical regional party preferences are reconstructed, which are necessary to
compute the inter-regional political distances defined equation (12). Subsequently, it de-
scribes the procedure followed to compute the historical regional population shares utilized
to translate these inter-regional political distances into estimates of the political distinc-
tiveness of regional policy preferences, according to equation (13). Table A1 provides an
overview of the regions and election years included in our analysis.
C.1.1 Historical electoral data
In general, to construct country-specific historical time series of regional party vote shares,
we mainly rely on the constituency-level electoral results of national elections to the lower
house as reported by Caramani (2004) and Brancati (2007), aggregate the results at the
territorial levels of the relevant present-day NUTS-regions and subsequently maximally
extend these figures forward using the more recent electoral information contained in
Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016) and A´lvarez-Rivera (2016).
More specifically, in a first step, we collect historical information on the constituency-
level number of party votes for all available competing parties. We only collect information
on votes for specific parties, ignoring votes for ‘unknown’, ‘other’ or ‘miscellaneous’ parties
as well as postal and invalid votes. In case of plural voting, where possible, we aggregate
votes according to the ‘one man, one vote’-principle while only taking into account the
first-ballot results during multiple-ballot elections. Additionally, to obtain estimates of
party votes in constituencies with uncontested elections, we assume that the winning party
received all valid votes expressed in the constituency whenever this data is available, and
otherwise approximate this information by multiplying the average fraction of valid votes
in total eligible votes in the other available constituencies in the country with the number
of eligible votes in the constituency under consideration. Finally, any remaining missing
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figures are linearly interpolated whenever this was feasible.33
Subsequently, to give the data a historic continuity, these historical constituency-level
electoral results are aggregated at the levels of the relevant present-day NUTS regions
(Eurostat, 2015). To maximally accommodate any breaks in the continuity of the under-
lying territorial units, a concordance table is constructed for each available election year
to recombine historical electoral constituencies into their respective present-day NUTS
regions.34 Territorial units that historically formed a part of the national territory, but
later split off, are assigned an ‘artificial’ NUTS classification code, and are thus included
in the computation of the index of regional political distinctiveness.
Finally, these regional time series are maximally extended forward using more recent
electoral data sources such as Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016) and A´lvarez-
Rivera (2016). Since these data sources fully report regional electoral outcomes according
to NUTS regions, this extension is relatively straightforward. Table A2 provides a break-
down of all relevant data sources and describes the specific data construction procedure
utilized by country.
C.1.2 Historical population statistics
Gathering information on the historical population sizes of the European regions consid-
ered in our analysis, we mainly rely on the historical demographic data of administrative
divisions reported by Lahmeyer (2006), aggregate the results to reflect the territorial
structure of the relevant present-day NUTS-regions and extend these time series forward
utilizing the more recent information contained in Eurostat (2016b).
More specifically, in a first step, we collect historical information on the population
figures of European administrative divisions. Subsequently, we construct country-specific
concordance tables to aggregate these historical administrative divisions into the relevant
contemporary NUTS regions.34 After linearly interpolating missing observations, we con-
sider regional population growth rates in several alternative data sources to maximally
extend existing trajectories forward.35 Table A3 provides further details and a breakdown
of the data sources by country.
C.2 Regional income distributions
To simulate regional income distributions, we follow Schokkaert and Decancq (2013) and
depart from the most recent income information contained in the ESS (Norwegian Social
Science Data Services, 2016) to simulate regional income distributions. More specifically,
this information is collected through a specific question asking respondents to “please tell
33Note that both uncontested and missing electoral results are extremely rare and generally restricted to
a small number of electoral constituencies in a small number of pre-1900 election years, see table A2.
34 Due to space limitations, we do not report the concordance tables utilized in our analysis. These are
available upon request.
35The overlapping regional population trajectories of all data sources are highly correlated, thus it does
not really matter which data source is selected to extend the baseline time series forward.
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me which letter describes your household’s total income, after tax and compulsory deduc-
tions, from all sources?”. Respondents make use of country- and wave-specific showcards,
typically containing 10 income decile values, to indicate their estimated position in the
national income distribution.
In a first step, to minimize any potential biases resulting from sampling errors or non-
response, we weigh individual answers based on the post-stratification weights provided
by the ESS. In practice, this is achieved by duplicating individual answers the number of
times given by the rounded value of 100 times their associated post-stratification weight.
For example, a respondent with a post-stratification weight of 1.23456 would have his or
her total household income appearing 123 times in the expanded dataset. This ensures
that these ‘simulated agents’ maximally replicate the distributions of age-group, gender
and education that are actually observed in the populations of the regions involved.
Subsequently, relying on the answers in this expanded dataset, we convert each re-
ported position to its corresponding monetary value (in euros). For the first nine deciles,
implicitly assuming a uniform income distribution within each separate decile, we select
the midpoint of each income decile. The monetary value corresponding to the 10th decile
is constructed such that the simulated S80/S20 income quintile share ratio in each country
corresponds exactly to their actual S80/S20 income quintile share ratio, as reported by
Eurostat (2016c).36 Finally, we divide this simulated distribution of disposable household
income by the reported number of household members to arrive at estimates of the per
capita income level of each simulated agent in our dataset.
This procedure allows us to approximate the actual income distributions in 260 Euro-
pean regions. For the four remaining regions not included in any of the ESS-waves (the
Italian region of Molise, the Portuguese regions of Ac¸ores and Madeiras and Corsica in
France), the income distributions are taken to be the same as those of the region with
the most similar average income level in their respective countries. Table A4 provides a
breakdown of the ESS waves and corresponding years utilized in this procedure by country.
36 In Denmark, aplying this procedure to the most recently available ESS wave yields an estimate of the
monetary value associated with the 10th income decile that lies below the estimated monetary value
associated with the 9th decile. Therefore, we simulate regional income distributions in Denmark relying
on the previous ESS wave.
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Table A1: Regional electoral data
Country Regional units NUTS Electoral data # Elections Excluded
Austria (AT) 9 bundesla¨nder 2 1891-2014 29 -
Belgium (BE) 3 re´gions 1 1847-2014 65 -
Bulgaria (BG) 27 oblasts 3 1990-2014 9 -
Czech Republic (CZ) 8 oblasts 2 1990-2013 8 -
Denmark (DK) 5 regioner 2 1849-2015 64 Faroe Islands**
Estonia (EE) 5 groups of counties 3 1992-2011 6 -
Finland (FI) 4 storomr˚aden 2 1907-2015 37 A˚land*
France (FR) 23 re´gions 2 1894-2012 21 4 de´partements d’outre mer**
(West-)Germany (DE) 16 la¨nder 1 1871-2013 37 -
Greece (EL) 13 perifereies 2 1926-2012 25 -
Hungary (HU) 7 terveze´si-statisztikai re´gio´k 2 1990-2014 7 -
Ireland (IE) 8 statistical regions 3 1922-2011 27 -
Italy (IT) 19 regioni 2 1876-2013 27 Valle d’Aosta*
Latvia (LV) 6 statistical regions 3 1993-2014 8 -
Lithuania (LT) 10 counties 3 2000-2012 4 -
Netherlands (NL) 12 provincies 2 1897-2012 33 -
Norway (NO) 7 regions 2 1882-2013 35 -
Poland (PL) 16 vovoidships 2 1991-2011 7 -
Portugal (PT) 7 comisso˜es de coordenac¸a˜o regional 2 1975-2015 15 -
Romania (RO) 8 regiuni 2 1990-2012 7 -
Slovakia (SK) 4 oblasts 2 1990-2012 8 -
Slovenia (SI) 2 Kohezijske regije 2 1992-2011 6 -
Spain (ES) 19 comunidades/ciudades auto´nomas 2 1977-2015 12 -
Sweden (SE) 8 riksomr˚aden 2 1911-2014 32 -
Switzerland (CH) 7 regions 2 1848-2015 50 -
United Kingdom (UK) 11 statistical regions 1 1832-2015 44 Northern Ireland*
Note: This table summarizes the data coverage of the regional regional electoral and demographic data underlying figure 1. The general data construction procedure is outlined
in appendix C.1, while tables A2 and A3 provide a more detailed description of country-specific data sources and construction methods.
* = excluded due to non-existing overlap with the national political party landscape; ** = excluded due to limited data availability.
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Table A2: Electoral data availability by country
Austria (NUTS 2)
Code La¨nder 1897-1911 1919-2008 Code La¨nder 1897-1911 1919-2008
AT11 Burgenland 1 x AT90 Bo¨hmen x
AT12 Niedero¨sterreich x x AT91 Bukowina x
AT13 Wien 2 x AT92 Dalmatien x
AT21 Ka¨rnten x x AT93 Galizien x
AT22 Steiermark x3 x AT94 Go¨rz und Gradisca x
AT31 Obero¨sterreich x x AT95 Istria x
AT32 Salzburg x x AT96 Krain x
AT33 Tirol x x AT97 Ma¨hren x
AT34 Vorarlberg x x AT98 Silezia x
AT99 Triest x
1891-1986, Caramani (2004); 1990-2008, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 2014, A´lvarez-Rivera (2016).
997 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
1 Burgenland returned to Austria in 1921, first election in 1923.
2 Disaggregated data on Vienna unavailable in imperial period.
3 Includes Slovenian parts of the Duchy of Styria in the imperial period.
Belgium (NUTS 2)
Code Provincie 1848-2014 Code Provincie 1848-2014
BE10 Re´gion de Bruxelles-Capitale x4,5 BE31 Brabant Wallon x4
BE21 Antwerpen x4,5 BE32 Hainaut x4
BE22 Limburg x4,5 BE33 Lie´ge x4
BE23 Oost-Vlaanderen x4,5 BE34 Luxembourg x4
BE24 Vlaams-Brabant x4,5 BE35 Namur x4
BE25 West-Vlaanderen x4,5
1847-1987 Caramani (2004); 1991-2010 Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 2014 A´lvarez-Rivera (2016).
7481 party-constituency/region-year observations: 99.5% non-missings, 0.13% uncontested results approximated, 0.37% results linearly interpolated.
4 Post-1968, votes are aggregated over party families, after Belgian political parties split in Flemish and Walloon wings (Caramani, 2004, p.153).
5 2007 election: votes for the CD&V-NVA coalition are distributed to CD&V and NVA according to the regional number of preference votes.
Bulgaria (NUTS 3)
Code Podregiony 1990-2014 Code Podregiony 1990-2014
BG311 Vidin x BG341 Burgas x
BG312 Montana x BG342 Sliven x
BG313 Vratsa x BG343 Yambol x
BG314 Pleven x BG344 Stara Zagora x
BG315 Lovech x BG411 Stolitsa x
BG321 Veliko Tarnovo x BG412 Sofia x
BG322 Gabrovo x BG413 Blagoevgrad x
BG323 Ruse x BG414 Pernik x
BG324 Razgrad x BG415 Kyustendil x
BG325 Silistra x BG421 Plovdiv x
BG331 Varna x BG422 Haskovo x
BG332 Dobrich x BG423 Pazardzhik x
BG333 Shumen x BG424 Smolyan x
BG334 Targovishte x BG425 Kardzhali x
1990, Bochsler (2010) ; 1991-2005, Kollman, Caramani, Backer, and Lublin (2014) ; 2009-2014, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016).
6640 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
Czech Republic (NUTS 2)
Code Oblasti 1990-2013 Code Oblasti 1990-2013
CZ01 Praha x CZ05 Severovy´chod x
CZ02 Str˘edn´ı C˘echy x CZ06 Jihovy´chod x
CZ03 Jihoza´pad x CZ07 Str˘edn´ı Morava x6
CZ04 Severoza´pad x CZ08 Moravskoslezsko x6
1990-2006, Kollman et al. (2014) ; 2010, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 2013 A´lvarez-Rivera (2016).
1568 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
6 Morava & Moravskoslezsko votes reported aggregately between 1990-1998.
Denmark (NUTS 3)
Code Landsdele 1849-2014 Code Landsdele 1849-2014
DK011 Byen København x DK031 Fyn x
DK012 Københavns omegn x DK032 Sydjylland x
DK013 Nordsjælland x DK041 Vestjylland x
DK014 Bornholm x DK042 Østjylland x
DK021 Østsjælland x DK050 Nordjylland x
DK022 Vest- og Sydsjælland x
1849-1988 Caramani (2004); 1990-2011, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 2015, A´lvarez-Rivera (2016).
10528 party-constituency/region-year observations: 90.16% non-missings, 1.83% uncontested results approximated, 8.01% results linearly interpolated.
Estonia (NUTS 3)
Code Groups of Maakond 1990-2013 Code Groups of Maakond 1990-2013
EE001 Po˜hja-Eesti x EE007 Kirde-Eesti x
EE004 La¨a¨ne-Eesti x EE008 Lo˜una-Eesti x
EE006 Kesk-Eesti x
1992-2011, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016).
380 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
Finland (NUTS 2)
Code Storomr˚aden 1907-1939 1945-2015 Code Storomr˚aden 1907-1939 1945-2015
FI19 La¨nsi-Suomi x x FI1D Pohjois- ja Ita¨-Suomi x x
FI1B Helsinki-Uusimaa x x FI20 A˚land x x
FI1C Etela¨-Suomi x x FI91 Viipurin x 7
1907-1987 Caramani (2004); 1991-2011, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 2015, A´lvarez-Rivera (2016).
3168 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
7 Lost to Soviet Union after World War II.
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France8 (NUTS 2)
Code Re´gions 1893 1917-2012 Code Re´gions 1893 1917-2012
FR10 Iˆle de France x x FR61 Aquitaine x x
FR21 Champagne-Ardenne x x FR62 Midi-Pyre´ne´es x x
FR22 Picardie x x FR63 Limousin x x
FR23 Haute-Normandie x x FR71 Rhoˆne-Alpes x x
FR24 Centre x x FR72 Auvergne x x
FR25 Basse-Normandie x x FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon x x
FR26 Bourgogne x x FR82 Provence-Alpes-Coˆte d’Azur x x
FR30 Nord - Pas-de-Calais x x FR83 Corse x x
FR41 Lorraine x x FRA1 Guadeloupe x x
FR42 Alsace x x FRA2 Martinique x x
FR43 Franche-Comte´ x9 x FRA3 Guyane x x
FR51 Pays de la Loire x x FRA4 La Re´union x x
FR52 Bretagne x x FRA5 Mayotte x x
FR53 Poitou-Charentes x x
1894, Avenel (1894); 1910-1988 Caramani (2004); 1993-2002, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 2007-2012, A´lvarez-Rivera (2016).
14048 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
8 Electoral results missing between 1894-1910.
9 Excluding Territoire-de-Belfort.
Germany10 (NUTS 2)
Code Regierungsbezirke 1871-1912 1919-1933 1949-2013 Code Regierungsbezirke 1871-1912 1919-1933 1949-2013
DE11 Stuttgart x x x DEA2 Ko¨ln x x x
DE12 Karlsruhe x x x DEA3 Mu¨nster x 12 x
DE13 Freiburg x x DEA4 Detmold x x
DE14 Tu¨bingen x x DEA5 Arnsberg x 12 x
DE21 Oberbayern x x x DEB1 Koblenz x x x
DE22 Niederbayern x x x DEB2 Trier x x
DE23 Oberpfalz x x DEB3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz x x x
DE24 Oberfranken x x DEC0 Saarland x x
DE25 Mittelfranken x x x DED2 Dresden x x x13
DE26 Unterfranken x x DED4 Chemnitz x x x13
DE27 Schwaben x x DED5 Leipzig x x x13
DE30 Berlin x x x13 DEE0 Sachsen-Anhalt x x x13
DE40 Brandenburg x x x13 DEF0 Schleswig-Holstein x x x
DE50 Bremen x x DEG0 Thu¨ringen x x x13
DE60 Hamburg x x x DEZ1 Ostpreußen x x
DE71 Darmstadt x x x DEZ2 Westpreußen x
DE72 Gießen x x DEZ3 Greater Poland x 12
DE73 Kassel x x x DEZ4 Kujawsko-Pomorskie x 12
DE80 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern x x x13 DEZ5 Lower Silesia x x
DE91 Braunschweig x x11 x DEZ6 Opole x x
DE92 Hannover x x x DEZ7 Silesia x
DE93 Lu¨neburg x 12 x DEZ8 Syddanmark x
DE94 Weser-Ems x 12 x DEZ9 Alsace x
DEA1 Du¨sseldorf x x x
1871-1987 Caramani (2004); 1990-2009, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 2013, Der Bunderwahlleiter (2016).
43530 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
10 We do not distinguish between CDU and CSU votes.
11 1919 electoral results missing.
12 1919 electoral results available.
13 1949-1987 not available (East Germany under Soviet occupation).
Greece14 (NUTS 2)
Code Perifereies 1926-2012 Code Perifereies 1926-2012
EL30 Attica x EL54 Epirus x
EL41 North Agean x15 EL61 Thessaly x
EL42 South Agean x EL62 Ionian Islas x
EL43 Kreta x * EL63 Western Greece x
EL51 Eastern Macedonia & Thrace x15 EL64 Central Greece x
EL52 Central Macedonia x EL65 Peloponnese x
EL53 Western Macedonia x15
1926-1989 Caramani (2004); 1990-2012, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016).
7003 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
14 Electoral results of the 1933 & 1950 elections dropped due to “significant errors in the official publication” Caramani (2004, p.469).
15 1952 electoral results missing.
Hungary (NUTS 3)
Code Megye´k 1992-2014 Code Megye´k 1992-2014
HU101 Budapest x HU233 Tolna x
HU102 Pest x HU311 Borsod-Abau´j-Zemple´n x
HU211 Feje´r x HU312 Heves x
HU212 Koma´rom-Esztergom x HU313 No´gra´d x
HU213 Veszpre´m x HU321 Hajdu´-Bihar x
HU221 Gyo˝r-Moson-Sopron x HU322 Ja´sz-Nagykun-Szolnok x
HU222 Vas x HU323 Szabolcs-Szatma´r-Bereg x
HU223 Zala x HU331 Ba´cs-Kiskun x
HU231 Baranya x HU332 Be´ke´s x
HU232 Somogy x HU333 Csongra´d x
1990-2010, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 2014 A´lvarez-Rivera (2016).
1900 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
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Ireland (NUTS 3)
Code Region 1922-2011 Code Region 1922-2011
IE011 Border x IE022 Mid-East x
IE012 Midland x IE023 Mid-West x
IE013 West x IE024 South-East x
IE021 Dublin x IE025 South-West x
1922-1989 Caramani (2004); 1992-2011, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016).
5472 party-constituency/region-year observations: 99.63% non-missings, 0.37% uncontested results approximated.
Italy (NUTS 2)
Code Region 1876-2013 Code Region 1876-2013
ITC1 Piemonte x ITG2 Sardegna x
ITC2 Valle d’Aosta/Valle´e d’Aoste x16 ITH3 Veneto x
ITC3 Liguria x ITH4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia x18
ITC4 Lombardia x ITH5 Emilia-Romagna x
ITF1 Abruzzo x17 ITH9 Trentino-Alto Adige/Su¨dtirol x18
ITF2 Molise x17 ITI1 Toscana x
ITF3 Campania x ITI2 Umbria x
ITF4 Puglia x ITI3 Marche x
ITF5 Basilicata x ITI4 Lazio x
ITF6 Calabria x ITZ1 Zadar x19
ITG1 Sicilia x
1876-1996 Caramani (2004); 2001-2006, A´lvarez-Rivera (2016); 2008-2013, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016).
25240 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
16 Became an autonomous province of Italy in 1944: only available after 1944.
17 Abruzzo & Molise votes reported aggregately between 1876-1913.
18 Became a part of Italy after World War I as a result of the Treaties of Paris: only available after 1919.
19 Constituency formed in the interbellum, but lost after World War II. Only available in 1921.
Latvia (NUTS 3)
Code Statistiskie re?ioni 1993-2014 Code Statistiskie re?ioni 1993-2014
LV003 Kurzeme x LV007 Pier¯iga x
LV005 Latgale x LV008 Vidzeme x
LV006 Ri¯ga x LV009 Zemgale x
1993-2011, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 2014 Centrala Ve¯le¯sˇanu Komisija (2016).
5240 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
Lithuania (NUTS 3)
Code Apskritys 2000-2012 Code Apskritys 2000-2012
LT001 Alytaus apskritis x LT006 Sˇiauli? apskritis x
LT002 Kauno apskritis x LT007 Taurage´s apskritis x
LT003 Klaipe˙dos apskritis x LT008 Telˇsiu¸ apskritis x
LT004 Marijampole˙s apskritis x LT009 Utenos apskritis x
LT005 Paneve´zˇio apskritis x LT00A Vilniaus apskritis x
2000-2012, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016).
4402 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
Netherlands (NUTS 2)
Code Provincies 1897-2012 Code Provincies 1897-2012
NL11 Groningen x NL31 Utrecht x
NL12 Friesland x NL32 Noord-Holland x
NL13 Drenthe x20 NL33 Zuid-Holland x
NL21 Overijssel x NL34 Zeeland x20
NL22 Gelderland x NL41 Noord-Brabant x
NL23 Flevoland x21 NL42 Limburg x20
1897-1979 Caramani (2004); 1994-2012, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016).
5551 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
20 Electoral results missing in 1917.
21 The artificial island of Flevoland (completed in 1968) became a separate Dutch province in 1986: only available after 1986.
Norway (NUTS 2)
Code Regions 1882-2013 Code Regions 1882-2013
NO01 Oslo og Akershus x NO05 Vestlandet x
NO02 Hedmark og Oppland x NO06 Trøndelag x
NO03 Sør-Østlandet x NO07 Nord-Norge x
NO04 Agder og Rogaland x x
1882-1989 Caramani (2004); 1993-2013, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016).
5803 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
Poland (NUTS 2)
Code Wojewo´dztwa 1991-2011 Code Wojewo´dztwa 1997-2011
PL11  lLo´dzkie x PL41 Wielkopolskie x
PL12 Mazowieckie x PL42 Zachodniopomorskie x
PL21 Ma llopolskie x PL43 Lubuskie x
PL22 S´la¸skie x PL51 Dolnos´la¸skie x
PL31 Lubelskie x PL52 Opolskie x
PL32 Podkarpackie x PL61 Kujawsko-pomorskie x
PL33 S´wie¸tokrzyskie x PL62 Warmin´sko-mazurskie x
PL34 Podlaskie x PL63 Pomorskie x
1991-2011, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 1997 Kollman et al. (2014).
2624 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
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Portugal (NUTS 2)
Code Comisso˜es de Cooperac¸a˜o 1882-2013 Code Comisso˜es de Cooperac¸a˜o 1882-2013
PT11 Norte x PT18 Alentejo x
PT15 Algarve x PT20 Regia˜o Auto´noma dos Ac¸ores x
PT16 Centro (PT) x PT30 Regia˜o Auto´noma da Madeira x
PT17 A´rea Metropolitana de Lisboa x x
1975-1987 Caramani (2004); 1991-2011, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 2015, A´lvarez-Rivera (2016).
2739 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
Romania (NUTS 2)
Code Regiuni 1990-2012 Code Regiuni 1990-2012
RO11 Nord-Vest x RO31 Sud - Muntenia x
RO12 Centru x RO32 Bucuresti - Ilfov x
RO21 Nord-Est x RO41 Sud-Vest Oltenia x
RO22 Sud-Est x RO42 Vest x
1990-2012, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016).
3120 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
Slovakia (NUTS 2)
Code Oblasti 1990-2012 Code Oblasti 1990-2012
SK01 Bratislavsky´ kraj x SK03 Stredne´ Slovensko x
SK02 Za´padne´ Slovensko x SK04 Vy´chodne´ Slovensko x
1990-2010, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 2012, A´lvarez-Rivera (2016).
616 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
Slovenia (NUTS 2)
Code Kohezijske regije 1992-2011 Code Kohezijske regije 1992-2011
SI01 Vzhodna Slovenija x SI02 Zahodna Slovenija x
1992-2011, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016).
912 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
Spain (NUTS 2)
Code Comunidades 1992-2011 Code Comunidades 1992-2011
ES11 Galicia x ES43 Extremadura x
ES12 Principado de Asturias x ES51 Catalun˜a x
ES13 Cantabria x ES52 Comunidad Valenciana x
ES21 Pa´ıs Vasco x ES53 Illes Balears x
ES22 Comunidad Foral de Navarra x ES61 Andaluc´ıa x
ES23 La Rioja x ES62 Regio´n de Murcia x
ES24 Arago´n x ES63 Ceuta x
ES25 Comunidad de Madrid x ES64 Melilla x
ES41 Castilla y Leo´n x ES70 Canarias x
ES42 Castilla-La Mancha x
1977-1996 Caramani (2004); 2000-2011, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 2015, A´lvarez-Rivera (2016).
8870 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
Sweden (NUTS 2)
Code Riksomr˚aden 1911-2014 Code Riksomr˚aden 1911-2014
SE11 Stockholm x SE23 Va¨stsverige x
SE12 O¨stra Mellansverige x SE31 Norra Mellansverige x
SE21 Sma˚land med o¨arna x SE32 Mellersta Norrland x
SE22 Sydsverige x SE33 O¨vre Norrland x
1911-1988 Caramani (2004); 1991-2010, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 2014, A´lvarez-Rivera (2016).
4758 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
Switzerland22 (NUTS 2)
Code Regions 1848-2015 Code Regions 1848-2015
CH01 Lake Geneva region x CH05 Eastern Switzerland x
CH02 Espace Mittelland x CH06 Central Switzerland x
CH03 Northwestern Switzerland x CH07 Ticino x23
CH04 Zurich x
1848-1987 Caramani (2004); 1991-2011, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 2015, A´lvarez-Rivera (2016).
4386 party-constituency/region-year observations: 100% non-missings.
22 Due to the outbreak of World War II, there were no elections in nine of the 25 cantons:
Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Lucerne, Neuchaˆtel, Schwyz, Solothurn, Ticino, Valais, Vaud and Zug.
23 Electoral results missing in 1919 (see 22).
United Kingdom23 (NUTS 1)
Code Region 1832-1918 1922-2015 Code Region 1832-1918 1922-2015
UKC North East x x UKJ South East x x
UKD North West x x UKK South West x x
UKE Yorkshire & the Humber x x UKL Wales x x
UKF East Midlands x x UKM Scotland x x
UKG West Midlands x x UKN Northern Ireland x x
UKH East of England x x UKZ Ireland x
UKI London x x
1848-1987 Caramani (2004); 1991-2011, Norwegian Centre for Research Data (2016); 2015, A´lvarez-Rivera (2016).
72488 party-constituency/region-year observations: 94.76% non-missings, 1.33% uncontested results approximated.
23 68 missing constituency-level election results, scattered between 1832-1945. All pertain to small constituencies.
Note: This table provides a country breakdown of (historical) territorial structure, data sources and construction methods of the regional party
preferences utilized to compute historical inter-regional political distances (see discussion appendix C.1.1 and equation 12).
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Table A3: Regional demographic data
Country
Data source
Lahmeyer (2006) Eurostat (2016b) Cambridge Econometrics (2016)
Austria 1527-1999 2000-2015
Belgium 1801-1999 2000-2015
Bulgaria 1990-2015
Czech Republic 1992-2015 1990-1991
Denmark* 1901-2003 2007-2015
Estonia 2000-2015
Finland 1905-1989 1990-2015
France 1891-1989 1990-2015
Germany** 1838-1999 2000-2015
Greece*** 1971-1989 1990-2015
Hungary 1988-1999 2000-2015
Ireland 1656-1990 1991-2015
Italy 1861-1989 1990-2015
Latvia 1989-2000 2001-2015
Lithuania 2000-2015
Netherlands 1796-1999 2000-2015
Norway 1801-1999 2000-2015
Poland 1990-2015
Portugal 1878-1991 1992-2015
Romania 1989-1994 1995-2015
Slovakia 2000-2015 1990-1999
Slovenia 2002-2014 1991-2002
Spain 1926-1999 2000-2015
Sweden 1830-1999 2000-2015
Switzerland 1838-1989 1990-2015
United Kingdom 1801-1989 1990-2015
Note: This table provides a country breakdown of data sources and construction methods of historical regional
population shares of the NUTS regions listed in table A1 (see discussion appendix C.1.2 and equation (13).).
* Pre-1901 regional population for Denmark is missing. Constant population shares assumed between 1849-1901.
** Saarland population prior to 1919 approximated by the sum of the populations of the following cities:
Saarbru¨cken, Merzig, Neunkirchen, Saarlouis, Sankt Wendel.
*** Pre-1971 regional population for Greece is missing. Constant population shares assumed between 1926-1971.
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Table A4: Regional income data
Country ESS wave Year # Country ESS wave Year #
Austria 7 2014 13345 Ireland 6 2012 17997
Belgium 7 2014 15898 Italy4 6 2012 6151
Bulgaria 6 2012 18765 Lithuania 5 2010 14861
Switzerland 7 2014 13113 Latvia 4 2008 15931
Czech Republic 7 2014 15107 Netherlands 6 2012 15002
Germany 7 2014 26343 Norway 5 2010 14629
Denmark1 6 2012 13847 Poland 6 2012 14845
Estonia 6 2012 19558 Portugal5 7 2014 12559
Greece 5 2010 18500 Romania 4 2008 17163
Spain2 7 2014 15117 Sweden 7 2014 16260
Finland 7 2014 19006 Slovenia 3 2006 11744
France3 6 2012 18164 Slovakia 6 2012 12344
Hungary 7 2014 12064 United Kingdom 7 2014 17807
Note: This table provides a breakdown of the ESS waves utilized to simulate regional income distributions and the
number of ‘simulated participants’ for each separate country in our sample (see discussion appendix C.2).
1 ESS wave 6 used instead of ESS wave 7, see 36.
2 Only aggregate data for Ceuta & Mellilla: simulated income distribution are assumed to be representative for
both regions.
3 Corsica not included in any ESS wave: approximated by simulated income distribution of Auvergne.
4 Molise not included in any ESS wave: approximated by simulated income distribution of Sardegna.
5 Ac¸ores and Madeiras not included in any ESS wave: approximated by simulated income distribution of Algarve
and Alentejo respectively.
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Table A5: Present-day regional political distinctiveness in Europe: full results
# NUTS Region d̂r # NUTS Region d̂r
1 BG425 Kardzhali 0.573 133 BG332 Dobrich 0.152
2 PT30 Regia˜o Auto´noma da Madeira 0.561 134 FR43 Franche-Comte´ 0.152
3 ES51 Catalun˜a 0.502 135 LT001 Alytus County 0.151
4 PT20 Regia˜o Auto´noma dos Ac¸ores 0.496 136 FR23 Haute-Normandie 0.151
5 ES21 Pa´ıs Vasco 0.483 137 ITG2 Sardegna 0.150
6 UKM Scotland 0.481 138 NL42 Limburg 0.149
7 FR83 Corse 0.479 139 IE012 Midland 0.149
8 BG324 Razgrad 0.432 140 ITI3 Marche 0.148
9 ITH9 Trentino-Alto Adige/Su¨dtirol 0.403 141 BG322 Gabrovo 0.148
10 CH07 Ticino 0.399 142 FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon 0.147
11 BG334 Targovishte 0.318 143 ITF1 Abruzzo 0.147
12 EE007 Kirde-Eesti 0.314 144 DE2 Bayern 0.147
13 ES22 Comunidad Foral de Navarra 0.302 145 PL34 Podlaskie 0.147
14 BE1 Brussels-Capital Region 0.294 146 CH04 Zurich 0.147
15 BE3 Walloon region 0.263 147 NO06 Trøndelag 0.146
16 RO12 Centru 0.252 148 BG331 Varna 0.146
17 ES64 Ciudad Auto´noma de Melilla 0.249 149 EL54 Ipeiros 0.145
18 ES43 Extremadura 0.247 150 BG314 Pleven 0.145
19 ES11 Galicia 0.243 151 DEC Saarland 0.145
20 BG325 Silistra 0.243 152 ITC3 Liguria 0.144
21 LV005 Latgale 0.243 153 ITI2 Umbria 0.144
22 BG333 Shumen 0.242 154 EE008 Lo˜una-Eesti 0.143
23 ES63 Ciudad Auto´noma de Ceuta 0.241 155 EL42 Notio Aigaio 0.142
24 DE3 Berlin 0.240 156 BG323 Ruse 0.140
25 FR42 Alsace 0.237 157 SE11 Stockholm 0.140
26 ES70 Canarias 0.229 158 SK01 Bratislava Region 0.139
27 UKL Wales 0.228 159 PL21 Malopolskie 0.137
28 ES53 Illes Balears 0.223 160 FR26 Bourgogne 0.137
29 BG412 Sofia 0.220 161 EL62 Ionia Nisia 0.136
30 DE4 Brandenburg 0.219 162 BG321 Veliko Tarnovo 0.136
31 CZ01 Prague 0.218 163 ITH4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.136
32 PL32 Podkarpackie 0.216 164 CH03 Nordwestschweiz 0.136
33 FR63 Limousin 0.216 165 BG413 Blagoevgrad 0.135
34 UKK South West 0.214 166 AT33 Tirol 0.135
35 ES42 Castilla-La Mancha 0.214 167 BG423 Pazardzhik 0.135
36 ES62 Regio´n de Murcia 0.214 168 FI1C Etela¨-Suomi 0.134
37 LV003 Kurzeme 0.214 169 PT18 Alentejo 0.133
38 IE011 Border 0.213 170 FR24 Centre 0.133
39 DED Sachsen 0.213 171 AT13 Wien 0.132
40 DE5 Bremen 0.212 172 ITI4 Lazio 0.131
41 LT004 Marijampole´ County 0.212 173 PL63 Pomorskie 0.131
42 LV008 Vidzeme 0.211 174 IE024 South-East 0.131
43 DEE Sachsen-Anhalt 0.211 175 DE1 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 0.131
44 DEG Thu¨ringen 0.210 176 BG315 Lovech 0.130
45 UKC North East 0.209 177 NL34 Zeeland 0.130
46 CH01 Re´gion le´manique 0.209 178 BG411 Stolitsa 0.129
47 DE8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.204 179 PL42 Zachodniopomorskie 0.129
48 ES41 Castilla y Leo´n 0.204 180 NO04 Agder and Rogaland 0.129
49 FI1D Pohjois- ja Ita¨-Suomi 0.203 181 BG421 Plovdiv 0.128
50 LT007 Taurage` County 0.203 182 NL13 Drenthe 0.128
51 BG415 Kyustendil 0.203 183 ITC1 Piemonte 0.128
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52 ES61 Andaluc´ıa 0.203 184 EL53 Dytiki Makedonia 0.128
53 EL43 Kriti 0.202 185 IE022 Mid-East 0.128
54 ES23 La Rioja 0.200 186 AT22 Steiermark 0.127
55 LT00A Vilnius County 0.199 187 CZ08 Moravsosleszko 0.127
56 UKJ South East 0.198 188 SE31 North Middle Sweden 0.124
57 IE013 West 0.198 189 FI19 West Finland 0.124
58 ES30 Comunidad de Madrid 0.198 190 NO01 Oslo and Akershus 0.123
59 CH06 Zentralschweiz 0.197 191 NO07 Northern Norway 0.123
60 ES12 Principado de Asturias 0.196 192 BG342 Sliven 0.123
61 SE33 Upper Norrland 0.195 193 IE025 South-West 0.122
62 BG312 Montana 0.192 194 RO42 Vest 0.122
63 ES13 Cantabria 0.190 195 NL21 Overijssel 0.122
64 ES24 Arago´n 0.189 196 BG344 Stara Zagora 0.122
65 ES52 Comunidad Valenciana 0.189 197 FR71 Rhoˆne-Alpes 0.121
66 PL31 Lubelskie 0.189 198 PT15 Algarve 0.121
67 LT008 Telsiai County 0.187 199 SK03 Central Slovakia 0.120
68 LT009 Utena County 0.186 200 SE21 Sm˚aland and the islands 0.119
69 PL33 Swietokrzyskie 0.185 201 FR10 Iˆle de France 0.118
70 ITG1 Sicilia 0.185 202 EE001 Po˜hja-Eesti 0.118
71 BG311 Vidin 0.184 203 DEB Rheinland-Pfalz 0.117
72 BG414 Pernik 0.184 204 EL63 Dytiki Ellada 0.117
73 LT006 Siauliai County 0.183 205 CZ04 Northwestern Switzerland 0.116
74 BE2 Flemish region 0.183 206 DE9 Niedersachsen 0.116
75 NO02 Hedmark and Oppland 0.181 207 PL43 Lubuskie 0.115
76 BG424 Smolyan 0.181 208 DEF Schleswig-Holstein 0.115
77 AT34 Vorarlberg 0.180 209 EL61 Thessalia 0.114
78 UKI London 0.180 210 EL30 Attiki 0.114
79 IE023 Mid-West 0.180 211 RO41 Sud-Vest Oltenia 0.113
80 FR52 Bretagne 0.180 212 RO32 Bucuresti-Ilfov 0.113
81 LV006 Riga 0.179 213 PL62 Warminsko-mazurskie 0.112
82 FI1B Helsinki-Uusimaa 0.179 214 NO05 Western Norway 0.109
83 NL11 Groningen 0.178 215 PL41 Wielkopolskie 0.109
84 FR82 Provence-Alpes-Coˆte d’Azur 0.177 216 PT17 Lisboa 0.109
85 UKH East of England 0.176 217 CZ07 Central Moravia 0.106
86 IE021 Dublin 0.176 218 NL32 Noord-Holland 0.106
87 FR21 Champagne-Ardenne 0.174 219 EL64 Sterea Ellada 0.106
88 BG313 Vratsa 0.174 220 NL31 Utrecht 0.106
89 BG422 Haskovo 0.174 221 DEA Nordrhein-Westfalen 0.106
90 FR22 Picardie 0.174 222 DE7 Hessen 0.106
91 BG341 Burgas 0.173 223 DK01 Hovedstaden 0.105
92 UKD North West 0.173 224 RO22 Sud-Est 0.105
93 LV009 Zemgale 0.172 225 PL51 Dolnoslaskie 0.105
94 RO11 Nord-Vest 0.172 226 CZ02 Central Bohemia 0.104
95 LT003 Klaipe`da County 0.171 227 NL41 Noord-Brabant 0.103
96 FR61 Aquitaine 0.171 228 AT12 Niedero¨sterreich 0.103
97 NL12 Friesland 0.170 229 EL52 Kentriki Makedonia 0.103
98 ITH5 Emilia-Romagna 0.170 230 PL11 Lodzkie 0.102
99 ITF4 Puglia 0.169 231 PL61 Kujawsko-pomorskie 0.102
100 DE6 Hamburg 0.169 232 SK02 Western Slovakia 0.101
101 SE32 Middle Norrland 0.169 233 PL22 Slaskie 0.101
102 EE006 Kesk-Eesti 0.168 234 SE22 South Sweden 0.101
103 ITI1 Toscana 0.167 235 PT16 Centro 0.100
104 FR72 Auvergne 0.167 236 AT32 Salzburg 0.100
105 LV007 Pieriga 0.167 237 NO03 South Eastern Norway 0.099
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106 EL51 Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki 0.167 238 NL23 Flevoland 0.098
107 FR53 Poitou-Charentes 0.166 239 PL12 Mazowieckie 0.098
108 CH02 Espace Mittelland 0.166 240 CZ06 Southeast 0.097
109 FR30 Nord - Pas-de-Calais 0.164 241 DK02 Sjælland 0.097
110 ITF3 Campania 0.164 242 DK05 Nordjylland 0.096
111 ITF6 Calabria 0.163 243 RO31 Sud-Muntenia 0.093
112 ITC4 Lombardia 0.163 244 RO21 Nord-Est 0.093
113 FR62 Midi-Pyre´ne´es 0.163 245 HU31 Northern Hungary 0.092
114 CH05 Ostschweiz 0.163 246 HU10 Central Hungary 0.092
115 ITH3 Veneto 0.162 247 AT31 Obero¨sterreich 0.090
116 FR25 Basse-Normandie 0.162 248 CZ03 Southwest 0.090
117 UKE Yorkshire and the Humber 0.161 249 CZ05 Northeast 0.089
118 FR51 Pays de la Loire 0.160 250 SK04 Eastern Slovakia 0.089
119 PL52 Opolskie 0.159 251 NL22 Gelderland 0.089
120 EL65 Peloponnisos 0.159 252 SE12 East Middle Sweden 0.086
121 BG343 Yambol 0.159 253 NL33 Zuid-Holland 0.084
122 AT11 Burgenland 0.158 254 HU32 Northern Great Plain 0.083
123 AT21 Ka¨rnten 0.157 255 PT11 Norte 0.083
124 UKF East Midlands 0.157 256 SI02 Western Slovenia 0.082
125 FR41 Lorraine 0.155 257 SE23 West Sweden 0.082
126 UKG West Midlands 0.155 258 DK03 Syddanmark 0.077
127 ITF5 Basilicata 0.154 259 DK04 Midjylland 0.073
128 EE004 La¨a¨ne-Eesti 0.154 260 SI01 Eastern Slovenia 0.072
129 EL41 Voreio Aigaio 0.154 261 HU22 Western Transdanubia 0.067
130 LT005 Paneve`zys County 0.153 262 HU33 Southern Great Plain 0.061
131 ITF2 Molise 0.153 263 HU23 Southern Transdanubia 0.058
132 LT002 Kaunas County 0.152 264 HU21 Central Transdanubia 0.058
Note: This table provides an overview of the regional political distinctiveness of all regions in our sample (computation
& data sources: see discussion section 3 and appendix C.1).
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Table A6: Regional (in)stability in Europe: full results
# NUTS Region b̂r # NUTS Region b̂r
1 ES51 Catalun˜a 0.64 . . . . . .
2 BE2 Flemish region 0.84 120 NO02 Hedmark and Oppland 5.54
3 ES21 Pa´ıs Vasco 0.96 121 NL41 Noord-Brabant 5.66
4 UKM Scotland 1.12 122 NL33 Zuid-Holland 5.66
5 BG425 Kardzhali 1.29 123 DE8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 5.67
6 PT30 Regia˜o Auto´noma da Madeira 1.36 124 FR71 Rhoˆne-Alpes 5.68
7 ITH9 Trentino-Alto Adige/Su¨dtirol 1.46 125 FR62 Midi-Pyre´ne´es 5.70
8 BE3 Walloon region 1.53 126 BG415 Kyustendil 5.71
9 FR83 Corse 1.57 127 BG424 Smolyan 5.72
10 BG324 Razgrad 1.88 128 NL42 Limburg 5.78
11 RO12 Centru 1.95 129 AT12 Niedero¨sterreich 5.82
12 EE007 Kirde-Eesti 2.02 130 LT001 Alytus County 5.82
13 PT20 Regia˜o Auto´noma dos Ac¸ores 2.07 131 PL52 Opolskie 5.84
14 ITC4 Lombardia 2.17 132 CZ02 Central Bohemia 5.86
15 LV005 Latgale 2.39 133 FR63 Limousin 5.91
16 ES61 Andaluc´ıa 2.51 134 PL51 Dolnoslaskie 5.98
17 LT002 Kaunas County 2.54 135 DE9 Niedersachsen 6.03
18 UKJ South East 2.61 136 SE32 Middle Norrland 6.08
19 FI1D Pohjois- ja Ita¨-Suomi 2.64 137 CZ07 Central Moravia 6.09
20 BG334 Targovishte 2.65 138 NL12 Friesland 6.09
21 LV003 Kurzeme 2.75 139 CZ04 Northwestern Switzerland 6.11
22 LT003 Klaipe`da County 2.94 140 BG311 Vidin 6.11
23 SK02 Western Slovakia 2.95 141 PT18 Alentejo 6.13
24 RO11 Nord-Vest 2.96 142 IE024 South-East 6.21
25 ES22 Comunidad Foral de Navarra 2.99 143 ES63 Ciudad Auto´noma de Ceuta 6.26
26 LV007 Pieriga 3.03 144 NO05 Western Norway 6.31
27 LV008 Vidzeme 3.10 145 FR22 Picardie 6.32
28 DE2 Bayern 3.15 146 IE022 Mid-East 6.33
29 ES11 Galicia 3.22 147 BG423 Pazardzhik 6.34
30 ES52 Comunidad Valenciana 3.27 148 BG313 Vratsa 6.37
31 UKK South West 3.32 149 BG344 Stara Zagora 6.43
32 PL32 Podkarpackie 3.43 150 AT31 Obero¨sterreich 6.44
33 EE008 Lo˜una-Eesti 3.53 151 ES13 Cantabria 6.44
34 LT006 Siauliai County 3.60 152 BG343 Yambol 6.45
35 IE013 West 3.61 153 PL42 Zachodniopomorskie 6.49
36 ES70 Canarias 3.62 154 SE23 West Sweden 6.50
37 SK03 Central Slovakia 3.62 155 PL34 Podlaskie 6.56
38 BG412 Sofia 3.63 156 FR21 Champagne-Ardenne 6.74
39 IE011 Border 3.66 157 SE22 South Sweden 6.74
40 ITH3 Veneto 3.66 158 BG414 Pernik 6.75
41 ITH5 Emilia-Romagna 3.67 159 BG323 Ruse 6.76
42 CH07 Ticino 3.82 160 DE7 Hessen 6.77
43 RO22 Sud-Est 3.83 161 FR53 Poitou-Charentes 6.77
44 RO42 Vest 3.84 162 ITF6 Calabria 6.80
45 ITG1 Sicilia 3.85 163 BG312 Montana 6.82
46 BG333 Shumen 3.87 164 CZ05 Northeast 6.87
47 FR42 Alsace 3.87 165 EL52 Kentriki Makedonia 6.92
48 BG341 Burgas 3.96 166 FR41 Lorraine 6.95
49 UKH East of England 4.00 167 SE31 North Middle Sweden 7.01
50 PL31 Lubelskie 4.01 168 FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon 7.04
51 FI1C Etela¨-Suomi 4.02 169 FR72 Auvergne 7.04
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52 LV009 Zemgale 4.03 170 NO06 Trøndelag 7.05
53 DE1 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 4.03 171 ITC3 Liguria 7.07
54 PT11 Norte 4.03 172 BG422 Haskovo 7.10
55 DED Sachsen 4.07 173 IE012 Midland 7.16
56 DEA Nordrhein-Westfalen 4.07 174 BG314 Pleven 7.19
57 UKD North West 4.07 175 PL11 Lodzkie 7.20
58 LT008 Telsiai County 4.08 176 ITI3 Marche 7.21
59 FI19 West Finland 4.08 177 NL31 Utrecht 7.23
60 BG325 Silistra 4.09 178 BG332 Dobrich 7.27
61 ES41 Castilla y Leo´n 4.12 179 SE21 Sma˚land and the islands 7.28
62 FR82 Provence-Alpes-Coˆte d’Azur 4.12 180 CZ03 Southwest 7.31
63 IE025 South-West 4.14 181 BG321 Veliko Tarnovo 7.31
64 UKL Wales 4.21 182 FR25 Basse-Normandie 7.37
65 ITI1 Toscana 4.27 183 NL21 Overijssel 7.39
66 BG331 Varna 4.30 184 ITG2 Sardegna 7.41
67 ES62 Regio´n de Murcia 4.34 185 FR23 Haute-Normandie 7.42
68 LT004 Marijampole´ County 4.37 186 SE12 East Middle Sweden 7.43
69 ES42 Castilla-La Mancha 4.41 187 AT11 Burgenland 7.47
70 IE023 Mid-West 4.42 188 PT15 Algarve 7.49
71 SE33 Upper Norrland 4.46 189 ES23 La Rioja 7.50
72 RO31 Sud-Muntenia 4.46 190 HU31 Northern Hungary 7.67
73 DE4 Brandenburg 4.54 191 NO03 South Eastern Norway 7.68
74 ITF3 Campania 4.55 192 BG322 Gabrovo 7.74
75 LT009 Utena County 4.58 193 FR24 Centre 7.76
76 PL21 Malopolskie 4.60 194 ITF1 Abruzzo 7.79
77 ES53 Illes Balears 4.61 195 DK03 Syddanmark 7.83
78 LT005 Paneve`zys County 4.68 196 HU32 Northern Great Plain 7.85
79 ITF4 Puglia 4.72 197 NO07 Northern Norway 7.90
80 BG421 Plovdiv 4.74 198 DK04 Midjylland 7.94
81 PL33 Swietokrzyskie 4.77 199 PL61 Kujawsko-pomorskie 7.95
82 ES43 Extremadura 4.79 200 EL51 Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki 7.96
83 SK04 Eastern Slovakia 4.82 201 DEB Rheinland-Pfalz 7.97
84 NL11 Groningen 4.85 202 EL63 Dytiki Ellada 8.10
85 DEG Thu¨ringen 4.85 203 NL22 Gelderland 8.13
86 EE006 Kesk-Eesti 4.86 204 EL65 Peloponnisos 8.16
87 EL43 Kriti 4.90 205 ITH4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 8.27
88 UKC North East 4.90 206 ITI2 Umbria 8.43
89 ES12 Principado de Asturias 4.93 207 PL62 Warminsko-mazurskie 8.48
90 PT16 Centro 4.93 208 FR43 Franche-Comte´ 8.60
91 UKE Yorkshire and the Humber 4.94 209 EL42 Notio Aigaio 8.73
92 FR52 Bretagne 4.96 210 PL43 Lubuskie 8.73
93 AT22 Steiermark 4.98 211 FR26 Bourgogne 8.80
94 BG413 Blagoevgrad 4.98 212 AT32 Salzburg 8.81
95 AT34 Vorarlberg 5.01 213 ITF2 Molise 8.83
96 RO41 Sud-Vest Oltenia 5.02 214 CH01 Re´gion le´manique 8.89
97 EE004 La¨a¨ne-Eesti 5.02 215 BG342 Sliven 9.14
98 CZ08 Moravsosleszko 5.03 216 DK05 Nordjylland 9.31
99 LT007 Taurage` County 5.04 217 DEC Saarland 9.39
100 RO21 Nord-Est 5.06 218 DEF Schleswig-Holstein 9.41
101 DEE Sachsen-Anhalt 5.09 219 NL34 Zeeland 9.42
102 DE6 Hamburg 5.11 220 ITF5 Basilicata 9.43
103 UKG West Midlands 5.12 221 NL13 Drenthe 9.64
104 FR30 Nord - Pas-de-Calais 5.13 222 BG315 Lovech 9.66
105 NO04 Agder and Rogaland 5.15 223 HU22 Western Transdanubia 9.77
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106 FR61 Aquitaine 5.16 224 DK02 Sjælland 9.85
107 PL22 Slaskie 5.17 225 CH06 Zentralschweiz 10.14
108 ES24 Arago´n 5.23 226 EL53 Dytiki Makedonia 10.74
109 DE5 Bremen 5.27 227 EL54 Ipeiros 10.76
110 SI01 Eastern Slovenia 5.27 228 EL61 Thessalia 10.90
111 FR51 Pays de la Loire 5.41 229 EL64 Sterea Ellada 10.95
112 PL63 Pomorskie 5.43 230 HU33 Southern Great Plain 11.00
113 ES64 Ciudad Auto´noma de Melilla 5.47 231 HU21 Central Transdanubia 12.05
114 PL41 Wielkopolskie 5.47 232 EL41 Voreio Aigaio 12.14
115 AT21 Ka¨rnten 5.47 233 CH02 Espace Mittelland 12.46
116 CZ06 Southeast 5.48 234 EL62 Ionia Nisia 12.48
117 UKF East Midlands 5.51 235 CH05 Ostschweiz 13.44
118 AT33 Tirol 5.51 236 NL23 Flevoland 13.83
119 ITC1 Piemonte 5.53 237 HU23 Southern Transdanubia 14.37
. . . . . . 238 CH03 Nordwestschweiz 16.24
Note: This table ranks all included European region from most to least secession-prone, according to the stability
concept summarized in definition 1 (see discussion section 5).
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